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ABSTRACT 
China’s state-led finance to overseas projects becomes increasingly 
important, represents a growing financial trend among emerging market 
economies, and leads to the puzzle: to what extent are state-owned (policy) bank 
driven by state or by its own interest. The project compares China’s practice of 
overseas energy finance with Japan – a well-studied case of state-supported 
development – to highlight the characteristics of Chinese public financiers and 
integrate their practice into development theories.  
 The project speaks to three major development theories: the market model, 
in which banks pursue profit; the state model, in which banks are commanded by 
state; and the interest group model, in which conflicting goals clash in the repeating 
game between stakeholders. The project argues that banks balance their self-
interest and state assignments depending on the regulator-bank and bank-client 
bargains. 
In the project, the first research article compiles publicly available data on policy 
bank loan and calculates the influence of various determinants on loans granted 
   vi 
by policy banks. The findings are that Chinese and Japanese banks are driven by 
both profit and non-market goals and tend to invest in recipients with high risks. 
 Going beyond large-N statistical modeling, the second article uses archives 
and interviews to investigate to what extent do investment in risky projects are 
driven by state goals. The article develops an interest-group bargaining model, in 
which the analysis focuses on four sets of actors in the process of project formation, 
crisis emergence, and resolution/or lack of resolution. While projects with innate 
high risk are often considered as economic diplomacy, evidences suggest the 
projects are mostly driven by recipient governments and for-profit banks.  
The third, and final, research article relies on elite interviews and archival 
analysis to investigate the domestic politics of policy bank regulation and the 
formation of loan policies. Between China and Japan, the article formulates two 
different institutional structures that govern the effectiveness of policy bank 
regulation. In Japan, the structure is vertical, with paired ministry-bank regulations. 
In China, the institutional structure is more like umbrella-shaped joint regulation. 
This leads to more interactions between the leading regulator and banks and 
occasionally more efficient policy implementation.  
   vii 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1 State-Fueled Energy: Data Comparison of Energy Development Finance from 
Export Credit Agencies in China and Japan ............................................................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.1 Market Models ................................................................................................. 3 
1.2.2 State and Power Models ................................................................................. 5 
1.2.3 Risk-Adverse Models....................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Methodology .......................................................................................................... 9 
1.3.1 Data Selection ................................................................................................. 9 
1.3.2 Model Used in Study ..................................................................................... 14 
1.4 Data Summary and General Findings .................................................................. 20 
1.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 24 
1.5.1 Similarities and Differences among Banks ..................................................... 24 
1.5.2 Explanations of Predicted and Unpredicted Results ...................................... 26 
1.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 2 Investing with Risks: A Comparative Study of Energy Investments by Chinese 
and Japanese State-owned Financiers .................................................................................. 33 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 33 
2.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................. 35 
2.2.1 Market Theories ............................................................................................ 35 
2.2.2 Statist Theories ............................................................................................. 36 
2.2.3 Interest Group Theories ................................................................................. 39 
2.3 Research Design ................................................................................................. 43 
2.4 Japanese Cases of Risk Management ................................................................. 50 
2.4.1 Koto Panjang Dam ........................................................................................ 50 
2.4.2 San Roque Dam ............................................................................................ 54 
2.5 Chinese Cases of Risk Management ................................................................... 58 
2.5.1 Merowe Dam ................................................................................................. 59 
2.5.2 West Seti Dam .............................................................................................. 63 
2.5.3 Myitsone Dam ............................................................................................... 66 
2.6 Recap of Findings ................................................................................................ 70 
2.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 73 
   viii 
Chapter 3 Banking by Government: Comparative Study of Government-Policy Bank 
Relationships in China and Japan .......................................................................................... 76 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 76 
3.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................. 77 
3.2.1 Distorted Policy ............................................................................................. 77 
3.2.2 Ineffective Regulation .................................................................................... 80 
3.3 Research Design ................................................................................................. 80 
3.4 Different Structures of Bank Regulations ............................................................. 83 
3.4.1 Policy Bank Setup in China ........................................................................... 86 
3.4.2 China’s Overarching Regulatory Structure ..................................................... 89 
3.4.3 Policy Bank Setup in Japan ........................................................................... 93 
3.4.4 Japan’s Paired Regulatory Structure ............................................................. 96 
3.4.5 The Effect of Authoritarianism in Regulations .............................................. 101 
3.5 China’s Cases of Coal Reduction and Renewable Promotion ............................ 102 
3.5.1 Fragmented, Ineffective Coal Reduction ...................................................... 102 
3.5.2 Effective, Coordinated Solar Energy Promotion ........................................... 108 
3.6 Japanese Coal Reduction .................................................................................. 111 
3.6.1 Limited Policy, Less Coordinated Coal Reduction ....................................... 111 
3.6.2 Diminished advantage – less effective renewable promotion ....................... 115 
3.7 Recapping Chinese and Japanese Cases ......................................................... 118 
3.8 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 120 
Reference  ............................................................................................................................ 123 
Curriculum Vitae ................................................................................................................... 138 
 
  
   ix 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Comparison between CHEXIM, CDB, JBIC and their U.S. and German 
Counterparts ……………………………………………………………………….…. 10 
Table 1.2 Description of Variables ……………………….…………………….. 15–16 
Table 1.3 Regression Results ……………………………….………………...……  21 
Table 2.1 Different Characteristics of Each Case ………………………………...  70 
Table 3.1 Attitude on Coal Export Among Interviewees with Various Affiliations 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 107  
   x 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 The Role of Investor Governments Suggested by Home-Driven 
Theories ……………………………………………………………………………….. 48 
Figure 2.2 Proposed Interaction Model for Japanese and Chinese Cases ........  49 
Figure 3.1 Regulatory Structure in China and Japan …………………………….. 86 
  
   xi 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CDB China Development Bank 
CHEXIM China Export-Import Bank, or Export-Import Bank of China 
ECA Export Credit Agency 
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
JEXIM Export-Import Bank of Japan (predecessor of JBIC) 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan 
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan 
MOF Ministry of Finance (Japan and China) 
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan and China) 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission, China 
NEXI Nippon (Japan) Export Insurance 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
OOF Other Official Flows 
   1 
Chapter 1 State-Fueled Energy: Data Comparison of Energy 
Development Finance from Export Credit Agencies in China and Japan 
1.1 Introduction 
China has some of the largest export credit agencies1 (ECAs) in the world, 
including China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM) and China Development Bank. 
Existing studies of Chinese economic activities often suggest that the Chinese 
government uses ECAs to strategically support overseas economic activities, 
especially energy (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2013) and infrastructure, in order to achieve 
political goals of the state (Kamiński, 2017). In addition, existing studies also 
indicate that various forms of China’s other official flows (OOF) from ECAs, as well 
as concessional loans2 (Brautigam, 2009) from one ECA, share features with both 
commercial loans and political-driven assistance (Brautigam, 2011). Studying how 
Chinese ECAs balance market and political factors will contribute to understanding 
Chinese overseas economic activities. 
Chinese agencies are much larger and more essential than western ECAs, 
both in terms of asset and responsibility. Existed studies addressed various 
differences between Chinese and western model (Chin & Gallagher, 2019); 
however, there have been limited studies to integrate Chinese financial institutions 
                                                   
1 Defined by ECA Watch as “financial institutions specialized in issuing governmental export 
credit to exporters.” China Development Bank is a national developmental bank, but acts as an 
ECA in overseas economic activities. Refer to http://www.eca-watch.org/ecas/export-credit-
agencies 
2 While CHEXIM stresses on the similarities between concessional loans and loans, there are 
various reasons why concessional loans should be considered as subsidized loans instead of aid. 
The interest rate of Chinese concessional loans (usually 2-3%) is usually higher than ODAs from 
OECD countries. The concessional loans are used in combination with non-concessional loans in 
eligible countries. 
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into existed development model. On the other hand, Japan possesses multiple 
large ECAs. Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) functions similarly to 
the Chinese agencies. Both loans from JBIC and the concessional and non-
concessional loans from Chinese banks are not bound by OECD documents of 
official development assistance (ODA), and they have relatively high interest rates 
compared to aid. ECAs of relatively late-developing countries in the global 
economy, such as Japan and China, are significantly larger as they assume a 
substantial role in supporting overseas economic expansion and strategically 
strengthening certain industrial sectors. This study argues that JBIC is comparable 
to Chinese banks in terms of energy loans as the policy banks have comparable 
scale of loans and total assets. 
This study uses publicly available data of Chinese and Japanese energy 
investment to conduct quantitative study on the determinants of overseas energy 
loans from these banks, with the goal of comparing Chinese state agents to their 
Japanese counterpart. This paper argues that these ECAs share a lot of similarities 
in how they determine the amount of loans. Using the new database, the study 
finds that the three banks from both countries tend to invest more in countries with 
higher GDP per capita, but also invest more in countries with higher economic and 
political instability. This might indicate that a) as some of the biggest ECAs in the 
world, Chinese and Japanese policy banks act similarly; b) as expected from their 
role, ECAs in the study are attracted by profit, but also show tendencies that cannot 
be explained by laws of market, such as risk-seeking tendency and counter-
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cyclical investment. 
1.2 Literature Review 
This section summarizes the major theories regarding the determinants of 
policy bank loans and lists different possible motivations for ECAs to grant 
overseas loans. The first trend of thought is that the policy banks respond to market 
demand of loans, which in turn responds to market changes in both home and 
recipient country. The second trend of thought is that policy banks are driven by 
goals of the states, which can be both economic and political. In addition, a third 
trend of arguments suggest that public capitals, similar to private ones, will 
response to political and economic risks.  
1.2.1 Market Models  
According to classic economic development theory, the three factors that 
drive international economic activity are the current domestic market of a recipient 
country, the natural resources of a recipient country, and the potential for the 
recipient country to become an export platform. 
 (a) Market seeking theories suggest that overseas economic expansion is 
a result of overcapacity in investor countries. Akamatsu’s flying geese model 
suggests that the successful regional development in Asia is driven by “leader's 
imperative for internal restructuring” (Kasahara, 2004) (Akamatsu, 1962). 
Developed countries such as Japan actively encourage recipients to accept foreign 
investment; however, the process is driven by companies and profit instead of by 
government. Later, Japanese theorists developed a “multi-sequentialist” approach 
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to investment in developing countries that combined the production cycle theory 
(Vernon, 1966) with the regionalization of Asia (Ozawa, 2010) (Kojima, The “flying 
geese” model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and 
regional policy implications, 2000).  
(b) Resource-seeking theories is deeply rooted in the economic theories of 
comparative advantage. They suggest that the abundance of resources in recipient 
countries leads to trade and investment. Countries that have natural resources but 
lack significant capital and technology tend to attract overseas capital (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008). On the other hand, multinational companies invest overseas 
to seek natural resources that the home country cannot produce. While classic 
international trade models predict that countries export products that require an 
intensive use of its relatively advantageous resources (factors of comparative 
advantage), unmovable resources such as land might attract overseas investment. 
There have been various studies analyzing the motivation of private capital 
investing in developing countries that mention resource seeking behavior as a 
potential driving force (Reuber et al., 1973) (Yoshino, 1976). 
(c) Efficiency-seeking theories or “export platforming” theories explain 
economic activities involving economies with small domestic markets and limited 
natural endowments. Market efficiency theories treat direct foreign investment in 
countries sharing geographic, cultural and institutional proximities with investors 
as a corporal strategy to overcome an imperfect market (Crushman, 1985) 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976) (Dunning, 1979). Studies find that exporters might 
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trade with a country near a large market to gain an export platform, as is 
exemplified by the non-NAFTA investment practices in Mexico and Canada 
(Hanson et al., 2001). However, as explained below, this study focuses solely on 
energy sector. Economic activities in the energy sector, both trade and investment, 
are bilateral and do not involve export platforming. Therefore, these theories are 
not considered as a major determinant in this study. 
1.2.2 State and Power Models 
Contrary to market-based theories, these theories stress on the state as an 
active promoter of trade and investment. Political economic theory includes 
developmental state theories. These theories explain the presence of state in 
economic development, and statecraft theories, which treat energy loans – as well 
as other economic activities – as tools of achieving political and long-term 
economic goals. All of these theories suggest that the state is incentivized to 
intervene in the market. 
(a) The developmental state theories suggest that state actively supports 
economic activities for national economic gains. They treat overseas economic 
expansion as a national interest and stress the guiding role of the state in 
promoting overseas expansion, often using Japan’s economic miracle as an 
example (Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 1982). Japanese financial 
assistance and trade-promoting loans are instruments to bolster regionalism within 
Southeast Asian countries for market and resources (Ge, 2014), and many of 
Japanese ODAs before 1990s required deals with Japanese companies. Other 
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studies consider governmental financial agencies as guides for corporate 
investment (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996) (Horiuchi and Sui, 1993), as important 
inter-conglomerate coordinators (Schneider, 2013) and, in some cases, as 
financial supervisors (Gallagher et al., 2012).  
In the energy sector, state intervention is often implied to be related to 
energy security. In recent years, the two issues have become intertwined as 
energy demands from Asia have risen and disturbances in resource exporters and 
environmental pressure on fossil fuel have influenced oil prices (Yergin, 2006). 
Some studies (such as Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008) suggest that China and 
India’s investments in resource exporters are often supported by state-owned 
financial institutions. Case-based studies of the Chinese policy banks in Africa 
(Brautigam, 2009)(Foster et al., 2009), Russia (Downs, 2011) and Latin America 
(Gallagher et al., 2012) largely confirm the close ties between the financial 
assistance of policy banks and the projects of Chinese companies, but most of 
them do not find that state financial support is correlated to energy trade with the 
recipient country. Brautigam’s recent study specifically argues that there is no 
evidence supporting the argument that the Chinese foreign direct investments aim 
at resource trade with China (Brautigam, 2015). 
 (b) Statecraft arguments suggest that a state utilizes loans and aid policies 
for political goals (Norris, 2016). Statecraft theories argue that economic 
interactions strengthen political alignment between investors and recipients by 
creating similar interests, strengthening communication and reducing recipients’ 
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political and economic dependence on regional hegemons (Piccone, 2016). The 
study also suggests a reverse causality that economic activities, especially 
investments create common interest. On the other hand, Dreher (Dreher, 2009) 
uses vote alignment in the UN Security Council as a major indicator in IMF bank 
politics of loan approvals, suggesting that vote alignment can be a driving force 
leading to a loan. Studies of unilateral assistance (McGillivray, 1989) and 
international financial institutions (Thacker, 1999) heavily suggest that a major 
economy such as the US can use its financial leverage to gain political alignment.  
1.2.3 Risk-Adverse Models 
The risk and profitability concerns of banks also apply to most policy banks 
and are often addressed in various studies as control variables. Thacker (1999) 
studies IMF politics and derives a loan approval model based on economic factors 
(such as GDP per capita), political alignment (IGO vote alignment and war) and 
risk factors (such as a previous loan record, debt burden and balance of payment) 
as independent variables. Fleck and Kilby’s study on the World Bank’s lending 
employs similar groups of independent variables in addition to indicators of donor-
recipient economic dependence (Fleck and Kilby, 2005). Fleck and Kilby also 
consider trade potential (population, GDP per capita, openness), political 
alignment with the U.S. (UN vote), risk (inflation and exchange rate fluctuation), 
and international investment (World Bank and small donors’ commitments) as 
control variables. Other researchers (Bird and Rowland 2000) (Harrigan et al., 
2006) employ similar categories but use different independent variables for each 
   8 
category. While not directly studied in the decision-making process, domestic 
factors in recipient countries related to social development, such as 
democracy(Harrigan et al., 2006) and welfare indicators (Ben-Artzi, 2016) are also 
suspected to have an influence on loan approval in multiple financial institutions. 
Some previous studies suggest that state-supported financial institutions 
might be more risk tolerant compared to multilateral and private financial 
institutions. Studies by Buckley (such as Buckley et al 2007) find that Chinese 
overseas investments are often associated with politically risky countries. These 
results are also shown in other quantitative studies (such as De Beule & Duanmu, 
2012). As CDB and CHEXIM are the major financial agencies in Chinese overseas 
economic activities, it is implied that these policy banks might be less concerned 
with risks. 
In summary, the loan approval of policy banks can be affected by demand 
of loans, governmental assignments and the risk of the project. (1) Demand of 
loans are likely to be increased by various factors: domestic overcapacity, 
industrial upgrade or production in the flying geese model, or increasing need for 
resources. Recipient markets with good consumption potential are likely to attract 
trade and investment, and investors or exporters are likely to engage in overseas 
activities if domestic market is saturated and the product or service is competitive. 
(2) Governments might implement policy to encourage resource-related loans as 
resource dependence becomes more severe. In addition, the government might 
tend to grant energy-related loans if the country has high energy dependence. 
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Resource seeking can be both a natural reaction of the companies and 
governmental policy. (3) Governmental agencies might grant loans (as a part of 
OOF) to political allies even if they do not have resources or desirable markets. 
Investor-recipient political alignment may positively affect the amount of loans 
given to a country. (4) Economic and political risks of a country might discourage 
overall loan approval; however, some studies suggest that Chinese economic 
activities, often financed by policy banks, are less affected by these factors. The 
research question is whether these potential determinants of loans affect the 
amount of loans granted by Chinese and Japanese ECAs. 
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Data Selection 
This study assembles a combination of first-hand and second-hand data for 
quantitative study. A few characteristics of selected data need to be addressed. 
First, the study uses energy sector for a variety of reasons. The following table 
offers a brief comparison among JBIC, CHEXIM, CDB and two of their 
counterparts from major economies: Germany’s KfW IPEX Bank and the United 
States’ Export-Import Bank. As shown in the table, the Chinese and Japanese 
banks have much larger total assets compared to the other banks; however, the 
Chinese banks are also much larger than their Japanese counterparts. On the 
other hand, the total amounts of energy loans from JBIC, CHEXIM and CDB in the 
included period are similar, making the sector more suitable for comparison. Other 
sectors of loans, as well as total loans, do not have such comparability. 
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TABLE 1 COMPARISON BETWEEN CHEXIM, CDB, JBIC AND THEIR U.S. 
AND GERMAN COUNTERPARTS 
Name of the Bank Year Founded Total Assets in 
2015  
Eng Loan 
2005-15 
China Export-Import 
Bank  
1993  284,000.00  70,368.00 
China Development 
Bank 
1993 1,686,000.00 81,875.82 
Japan Bank for Intl 
Cooperation  
1950 (Japan Export Bank) 
1999 (as JBIC) 
2008 (as branch of JFC) 
2012 (as new JBIC) 
163,690.00  65,196.00 
KfW IPEX Bank  
1948 (KfW) 
2008 (independent IPEX)  
33,244.00  18,820.00 
Export-Import Bank of 
US  
1934-2015 (full function) 
2015-19 (limited function)  
4,892.50 93,13.38 
All data in Million USD (current) 
Data source: China’s Global Energy Finance (CGEF) Database; AidData; various official records 
on approved bank projects 
Another justification of selecting energy data is that energy sector is a 
typical sector in which economic activities are driven by both market and non-
market goals, as energy sufficiency is a vital concern of most industrialized 
economies. Energy loan by CDB contributes to 21% of its total loan records, which 
is larger than any other category. If the amount of loan is considered, 34% of CDB 
overseas loans are energy generation and supply. Energy loan by CHEXIM is 
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more diverse due to the institution focusing more on foreign trade, but energy loan 
also contributes to 21% of total loan records and 12% of total amount. 
 The last justification is data availability, as there is no reliable all-sector 
global project list for Chinese loans3, and the Chinese ECAs do not publish loan 
records to the public. This study cross-compares CGEF Database4, AidData and 
global loan data provided by ECA officials, constructing a dataset for CDB and 
CHEXIM. JBIC has categorized loan reports available on its website, which the 
study uses to construct comparable Japanese data. 
Second, the study constructs panel data from 2006 to 2015 from various 
sources for CHEXIM, CDB and JBIC loans (concessional and non-concessional) 
in the energy sector and constructs a corresponding set of data from various 
sources as independent variables. The time period is mostly selected based on 
data availability. The JBIC record of loans are available online, collected by JBIC 
itself; the Chinese records are manually gathered in China’s Global Energy 
Finance (CGEF) database by the author and other research fellows. The main 
                                                   
3 AidData (AD) from William and Mary College provides all-sector data from China to overseas 
recipients, including ECAs, commercial banks, non-financial agencies responsible for technical 
assistance. It is used as a cross-checking data source. This study chose the GDP database (up 
to 2016) for a more conservative estimate, with several validated AD entries to complement. AD 
is constructed using TUFF methodology, which can be summarized in three steps: standardized 
machine selection of news from the Factiva media database, manual validation, and data quality 
insurance procedures. This method theoretically offers a wide coverage of data thanks to the 
massive media collection, and the AD team has overall better resources via news database such 
as Factiva. However, there are records which can only be supported from Factiva or non-Chinese 
sources, and cases with inaccurate information. GDP data, on the other hand, stresses on open 
news sources and manual Chinese-English cross checking to ensure that the project has actually 
been implemented. About 20% of the AD records are covered in GDP data, and about 12% of the 
AD records are added in addition to GDP data. Both databases are accessible online. 
4 The database is publicly available on Global Development Policy Center, Boston University. The 
data can be accessed at https://www.bu.edu/cgef/#/intro 
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procedure of gathering CGEF data includes AI search and double-language 
manual verification. The loans are recorded on project basis (extension of an 
existing project counts as different project if a new contact has been signed). 
These formats are identical with JBIC records. 
Third, the data used in this study is the whole record of loans from the 
selected period, instead of a sample. There are 100 CHEXIM records, 43 CDB 
records and 101 JBIC records5 included in this study, which present a challenge 
to the quantitative study due to the small number of observations. It should also be 
noted that some of the CDB loans are significantly larger, such as deals with 
Russian, Brazilian and Venezuelan oil companies, while energy loans from 
CHEXIM and JBIC share more similarities in the amount of single loans and the 
proportion of loans. This paper will discuss outliers with qualitative data description 
after the presentation of results. The major goal of this comparative study is to 
compare CHEXIM and JBIC, which are functionally similar and have more records 
for comparison. CDB needs to be included as it acts as a de facto ECA. However, 
as the number of CDB observations are very small for quantitative study, a single 
model using CDB data suffers greatly from the low degree of freedom and potential 
distortion of large outliers. 
Fourth, energy loans are defined as loans granted to energy-related 
projects in any primary and secondary energy sector, including fuels and various 
types of electricity. In terms of activity, the projects are generally categorized into 
                                                   
5Several records are omitted in the regression due to incomplete data. 
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three types: power generation; transmission and exploration; and  reprocessing6. 
Combining power generation and exploration in the energy sector is a practice 
seen in public databases such as AidData and U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Due to the difference in loan records, this study identifies “energy 
loans” based on the following standards: (1) the included loan must be granted to 
a project taken by a domestic company (including its overseas branch) with an 
overseas destination; (2) involved projects must be related to one of the energy 
sectors, which include fossil fuels, hydroelectricity, solar energy, nuclear, wind 
energy etc.; and (3) involved operations must include one of the following activities: 
exploration and processing or power generation and transmission. There are 
certain correlations between sectors and activities, such as CHEXIM loans to oil 
sectors, which mostly involve exploration, but its loans to hydroelectric and coal 
sectors mostly involve power generation (including the export of equipment). 
Fifth, the other Japanese ECA that has similar scale with JBIC, Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), is not included. While the financing from 
ECAs is one of the key features of Chinese overseas economic activity, foreign aid 
is not as significant as state-supported loans. Japans two ECAs have distinctively 
different responsibilities, with JBIC focusing on loans and JICA focusing on aid. As 
a result, aid from JICA has different categories from loans; for example, a 
proportion of JICA energy-related aid is registered as administration and 
                                                   
6Exploration and processing are technically different sectors; however, the amount of loans to the 
construction of processing facilities are low in both CHEXIM and JBIC. The study counts them as 
the same sub-category, which does not affect the statistical research discussed below. 
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education, and cannot be categorized similarly to loans from other ECAs. Chinese 
concessional loans and export buyer’s credit “have the nature of grant”7, yet they 
function similarly to non-concessional loans aside from features such as lower 
interest rates (2-3%, which is still very different from western and Japanese ODA 
interest rates), extended repayment periods and very difficult application 
processes. The study argues that Chinese concessional loans are OOF and can 
be compared with JBIC loans. Japanese aid from JICA, on the other hand, 
functions differently from Chinese and JBIC loans and should not be directly 
compared. 
1.3.2 Model Used in Study 
There are yet to be any empirical studies on the determinants of CDB or 
CHEXIM’s overseas financing in the energy sector. The hypothesis of this study is 
that the Chinese banks weigh different factors similarly to their Japanese 
counterpart when issuing loans for overseas energy projects; there is limited 
empirical evidence supporting differences or similarities between Chinese and 
Japanese banks.  However, the development of both China and Japan involves 
governmental financial support to certain sectors. This study assumes that these 
largest ECAs act similarly. 
 This study uses a simple OLS model with consideration of recipient 
clustering. The issue of distribution and heterogeneity are mitigated by a number 
                                                   
7 “具有赠与性质” in mandarin; this term is used in various documents about concessional loan 
(such as State Planning Commision PRC, 2nd Loan Division, 2001). 
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of observations larger than 30. As for the independence of observations, the study 
is aware of the fact that many characteristics of the recipient countries are not 
captured by the indicators but can be influential to the approval of loans. There are 
also examples, such as the 2012 Australian loans by JBIC and the 2015 Pakistani 
loans by CHEXIM, where multiple loans to one recipient are approved in a short 
period because of bilateral cooperation. Examples of economic cooperation, such 
as the previous example, establish a precedence and foundation for future 
cooperation. Using the year as a fixed variable does not significantly affect the 
results of this study. 
TABLE 2 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Variable Name Theoretical 
Aspect 
Description 
Logged amount 
of issued energy 
loan  
Dependent 
variable 
Loan data come from reports from the two banks, as well as 
matching news reports. Logarithm is used to reduce the 
distortion of single large loans, which exist in both CHEXIM 
and JBIC (to avoid sub-zero values, the study uses ln 
(1+inv) as the logged value, however the amount of loan is 
large enough to negate the slight distortion). 
Energy 
dependency of 
investor 
Develop-  
mental 
state 
Net energy import per energy consumption; data from the 
World Development Index (WDI). 
Vote 
disagreement 
Statecrafts The UNGA vote difference between recipients and investors. 
The UN vote is used by Dreher 2009 and Piccone 2016, and 
used in the “US friend” calculation of Kilby’s models. Since 
the “key interest”, a key concept in Kilby’s measurement, is 
hard to define in cross-country studies, this study simply 
adds the total vote difference between investor and recipient 
in a single year as a variable. 
GDP per capita 
(investor/ 
exporter) 
Market 
seeking  
GDP per capita from WDI, measured by constant 2010 USD 
(similar to Fleck and Kilby 2005, who use PPP GDPPC). 
This is used as an indicator for investor wealth, which is a 
potential motivator of engaging trade or investing in 
developing countries. 
GDP per capita 
(recipient) 
Market 
seeking  
GDP per capita from WDI, measured by constant 2010 USD 
(similar to Fleck and Kilby 2005, who use PPP GDPPC). It is 
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 used as an indicator for recipient wealth and consumption 
potential. 
R & D 
expenditure of 
the investor 
 
Market 
seeking  
 
Research and development expenditure (percentage of 
GDP) of the investor from WDI. This variable measure 
technology advancement, which is a potential motivator of 
economic activities in developing countries. 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Market 
seeking  
GDP per capita growth from WDI. This indicates the 
economic growth in the near future 
Population of 
recipient 
Market 
seeking  
Population WDI. Since we are discussing energy, the 
number of users might influence government approval of 
projects 
Population 
growth 
Market 
seeking 
Population growth WDI, to show the prospect of potential 
consumers and cope with huge difference in flat numbers 
Inflation annual 
change 
Risk Inflation, consumer price annual percentage change, from 
WDI 
Governance 
indicator 
Risk Governance indicator from the World Bank. The indicator 
usually ranges from 2 to -3, with a higher score indicating 
more stable governance. 
 
The dependent variable is the logged loan8 amount issued for each project, 
converted to current USD. Logarithms are used to mitigate the distortion of a few 
major loans – for example, China’s oil imports from Brazil and Japan’s coal imports 
from Australia - which require much larger loan amounts per case compared to the 
construction of a single power station. The scale of loans from the two banks varies 
from 20-30 million to 5-10 billion USD9, which lead to 1-3 numerical differences in 
terms of the logged amount. For large projects, where loans are transferred by 
installment, such as the 30-years gas contract between CDB and Russian 
companies in 2009, this study uses total loans granted on contract. This is used 
                                                   
8 As mentioned in the table, the study uses ln(1+inv) so as to avoid negative values from -1 to 0. 
Since the amount of loans included in the study are usually large enough, the value of dependent 
variable is close to ln(inv). 
9 Deals in other currencies are converted to USD using annual average exchange rate. 
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because the decision of granting a loan is most likely to be influenced by current 
economic and political factors. Alternative methods of measurement, such as the 
proportion of one loan to total loans, do not yield substantial changes in practice.  
The independent variables are collected from various publicly available 
databases, particularly from the World Bank, to represent determinants in various 
theories. 
First, (1) the amount of GDP per capita of both investor and recipient (in 
constant 2011 USD) from the World Bank, (2) R&D expenditure for the investor 
and (3) additional control variables measuring the domestic consumption potential 
(including GDP per capita growth, population and population growth, all from the 
World Bank WDI) are used to represent various market factors contributing to 
overseas economic activities. These indicators measure the domestic drivers of 
overseas economic activities and market potential of recipient countries. 
Second, energy dependence is used to measure resource seeking 
behavior. The energy dependence variable comes from the World Bank database 
and is measured as a ratio of net energy import to total consumption. Chinese 
energy dependence has doubled during the selected period, from around 10 to 
above 20. Japanese energy dependence remained at a much higher level during 
the same period. 
Third, political alignment is used to represent political concern. For a single 
country study, specific issues, such as recognition of the “One China” principle, 
are better indicators. Fleck and Kilby (Fleck & Kilby, 2006) measure “friend or foe” 
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status by comparing US-recipient vote alignment in “core issues” and in “all votes.” 
However, for comparative study, it is difficult to find a measurable variable that 
bear political relevance in both countries. This study uses the sum of vote 
differences in UN council as a measure of political alignment. 
Fourth, annual inflation rates (World Development Indicator from the World 
Bank) and fragile state indices (Governance Indicator from the World Bank) are 
used as bank indicators of economic and political risk. Drawn from the empirical 
investigations of previous studies, and to maintain numerous degrees of freedom, 
this study deploys one indicator for each political and economic variable. The 
inflation rate is most often used as the variable to examine whether 
macroeconomic stability is a determinant of overseas loans (Kilby, 2008; Thacker, 
1999). Political stability is measured differently in various studies. For example, 
Harrison (2006) uses a 7-point democracy index, and Anderson (2008) uses 
several indices from the Country Performance Rating by the World Bank IDA. This 
study uses a single governance score as a political indicator, which takes political 
freedom, human rights, social development and various aspects of efficiency of 
governance into consideration. This single variable allows the model to maintain a 
relatively high number of degrees of freedom. The fourth model adds in commonly 
used national variables of recipient countries, such as population and growth, into 
the model as control variables (6). These indicators are sometimes used together 
in previous models, including Fleck and Kilby’s (2001, 2006) studies. 
 In summary, these variables are expected to respond to empirical 
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exploration in the following manner: 
Factors that will positively correlate to loans include:  
• GDP per capita (and growth) of recipient country; 
• population (and growth) of recipient country.  
• R&D expenditure of the investor. 
• Energy dependence of the investor. 
A few variables represent the economic development and domestic need of 
the investor: (1) energy dependence is predicted to increase energy loans, as 
resource seeking and developmental state theories imply; (2)R&D expenditure10 
and GDP per capita of investor are expected to motivate the investor to invest 
abroad, as implied in flying geese model, and the banks respond to the increasing 
demand of capital by approving more loans. The other indicators are 
characteristics of the recipient country, which generally represent either the current 
positive economic situation or positive economic prospects.  These positive 
conditions are expected to attract exporters or foreign capital according to various 
market-oriented theories. 
Factors that will negatively correlate to loans include:  
• UN vote disagreement; 
                                                   
10 Theoretically, the “technological gap” between the investor and recipient is important for 
overseas investment (Yao et al, 2017); however, the R&D expenditures of the recipient country 
suffer from an absence of data. Therefore, only the R&D expenditure of the investor is used. 
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• inflation rate of recipient country.  
• political risk. 
The UN alignment indicator measures divergence between investor and 
recipient. A negative correlation is expected as financial assistance is more likely 
to be distributed to friends and less likely to enemies. Inflation rate reflects 
economic stability, with higher inflation reflecting a higher degree of instability in 
the recipient country. This variable is used in various studies (for example, Thacker 
1999; Dreher 2006) as a factor discouraging loans. 
1.4 Data Summary and General Findings 
The results indicate a correlation between CHEXIM energy loans and 
China’s energy dependence. Loans in all models are positively correlated with the 
GDP per capita of the recipient country. In addition, aside from the joint Chinese 
model, the all-bank model, CHEXIM and JBIC models are negatively corelated 
with governance indicator, which measures political stability. JBIC loans are 
related with a wider set of variables, including inflation rates, population and GDP 
growth. 
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TABLE 3 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 (All banks) (CHEXIM/CDB) (CHEXIM) (JBIC) 
VARIABLES lninv lninv lninv lninv 
     
GDPPC (investor/ 
exporter) 
1.84e-05 0.000207 0.00104* 0.000151 
 (5.56e-05) (0.000551) (0.000606) (0.000201) 
GDPPC (recipient) 1.82e-05*** 6.22e-05** 5.84e-05* 1.93e-05*** 
 (5.01e-06) (2.49e-05) (3.07e-05) (5.96e-06) 
R & D expend. of the 
investor 
1.351*** -2.822 -3.033** -1.618 
 (0.496) (2.234) (1.544) (1.514) 
Vote disagreement 0.00636 -0.00961 0.00362 0.0110* 
 (0.00700) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.00612) 
Energy dependence -0.0436 0.230 0.00411 -0.0469* 
 (0.0276) (0.205) (0.208) (0.0270) 
Inflation annual 
change 
-0.00557 -0.00894 -0.0172 -0.0218 
 (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0186) (0.0192) 
Governance indicator -0.347*** -0.229 -0.358*** -0.593*** 
 (0.0936) (0.142) (0.137) (0.174) 
Population 8.20e-11 5.63e-10 -5.29e-10 -8.00e-10* 
 (2.14e-10) (3.77e-10) (3.94e-10) (4.27e-10) 
GDP per capita 
growth 
-0.0748** -0.0612 -0.0105 -0.0683*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0566) (0.0387) (0.0191) 
Population growth -0.00169 -0.161 -0.182 0.0322 
 (0.0444) (0.161) (0.139) (0.0336) 
Constant 3.971*** 7.627*** 6.087*** 8.134 
 (0.868) (2.469) (2.031) (6.021) 
     
Observations 228 127 80 101 
Number of recipient 
(fixed eff) 
63 46 35 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As mentioned above, the number of CDB observations is too small to 
construct an isolated model. In summary, all banks are likely to grant more loans 
to countries with higher GDP per capita. This is consistent with predictions aside 
from the CHEXIM/CDB combined model in which banks are likely to grant more 
loans to risky countries. The significances of other independent variables vary 
among models: 
• Ceteris paribus (same below), Chinese GDP per capita positively affects 
CHEXIM loans. This is coherent with the flying geese model that predicts 
economy to start export as it accumulates wealth. 
• The R&D expenditure of investor countries seem to have positive effect on 
loans in the three-bank model; however, the effect of R&D expenditure is 
negative in the CHEXIM model. 
• Overall model, CHEXIM and JBIC models indicate that the banks grant 
more loans to countries with political instability (lower governance indicator 
score). This might imply a tendency of these policy banks to finance projects 
in countries with high risk. The CHEXIM/CDB combined model does not 
show this tendency. 
• Only JBIC loans are affected by UN vote alignment, energy dependence, 
and population size (or growth). These results contradict predictions. 
• The growth of GDP per capita negatively affects loans in JBIC and overall 
models. This result contradicts predictions. 
Several indicators contradict predictions: First, R&D expenditure is 
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negatively related to energy loans in the CHEXIM models, which contradicts the 
theories that technological advancement incentivizes economic activities and 
therefore increases the demand for loans. Second, the World Bank Governance 
Indicator of recipient countries is negatively correlated to loan size in model 4, 
suggesting that the Chinese banks might be more apt to invest in energy in more 
politically unstable countries. To an extent, this is also consistent with the media 
criticism that the Chinese companies invest in countries with humanitarian and 
governance crises. Third, several indicators of positive recipient market growth 
negatively affect loans. Fourth, the Japanese bank grants more loans when the 
recipient is less aligned with Japanese political stances, and less when Japan is 
more energy dependent. 
 The R-squared of these models are low, indicating that the models do not 
capture all explanatory variables; however, this is not without precedent. While 
studies on direct investment (such as Yao et al. 2017) or multilateral banks (such 
as Thacker, 1999) have models of high predictive power, models aiming to explain 
the behavior of policy banks (such as Fleck and Kilby, 2006) have lower R-squared 
values. The conflicting and changing goals of policy banks make it difficult for 
quantitative models to measure the influence of different factors. For example, 
while some loans might be driven by political factors, the effects are offset once 
those market-driven loans are considered. Nevertheless, a few similarities and 
differences are observed in almost all the models and remain robust in several 
tests (see appendix), which helps to validate these characteristics. 
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1.5 Discussion 
 The quantitative comparison shows that Chinese and Japanese policy 
banks share some similarities, including the issuance of OOF energy loans that 
are not bound by OECD regulation of ODA. Banks from both countries are 
attracted by countries with more current wealth. However, policy banks grant more 
loans to countries with more risk and negative political prospects. The following 
section discusses the aforementioned results and possible explanations. 
1.5.1 Similarities and Differences among Banks 
The three ECAs from the two countries, Japan and China, exhibit similar 
consideration of the domestic market of recipient countries. In all of these cases, 
recipient countries with higher GDP per capita are granted significantly more loans. 
This might indicate that the Chinese policy bank loans are based on recipient 
markets like JBIC, and that both Chinese and Japanese banks, despite their state-
supported background, follow the market demand for overseas loans like private 
capital investors. The discovery is consistent with a previous study arguing that 
while Chinese economic expansion in the selected decade are related to state 
goals, pursuit for business opportunities remains a strong driving force of Chinese 
overseas economic expansion (Bräutigam and Tang, 2012). The market-based 
factors confirm that some of the largest ECAs in Japan and China share certain 
similarities with private capital. 
Furthermore, the Chinese banks are similar to their Japanese counterpart 
in terms of their tendency to invest in politically unstable countries – countries with 
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lower governance indicator score. Countries with low governance score are not 
engaged in social and political unrest; however, their less stable domestic politics 
and lower degree of rule of law might result in higher investment and trade risk. In 
addition to the aforementioned variables, energy loans from these banks are also 
significantly influenced by a few other factors, including the growth rate of 
population and GDP per capita. Contradicting predictions, these correlations might 
indicate that a negative economic perspective of the recipient country increases 
energy loans from the selected banks. 
(2) The results also highlight some differences in the Chinese and Japanese 
models, which suggest that Chinese banks behave differently than their Japanese 
counterpart in terms of energy loan approval, particularly when certain factors are 
taken into consideration. Chinese and Japanese banks both react negatively to 
growth of recipient market potential, but they react to different indicators. 
Meanwhile, CHEXIM and JBIC also contradict different predictions: CHEXIM 
grants fewer loans as Chinese technology grows, whereas JBIC grants fewer loans 
as Japanese energy dependence grows. Additionally, UN vote alignment 
decreases expected amounts of loans. The following session will offer alternative 
explanations to these findings. 
(3)  Energy dependence is not a main driver for Chinese energy loans, if 
loans of all energy subsectors, including power generation, are included. In order 
to dive deeper into the motivation of CHEXIM and the energy policy of China, 
further quantitative study focusing on primary energy and exploration activity is 
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required. There is also a division of labor between CHEXIM and CDB11: CHEXIM 
is assumed to focus on trade and service exports, especially power station 
projects, whereas CDB focuses on major energy trades with exporters, including 
Venezuela, Brazil and Russia. Both studies focusing on energy trades and on the 
CDB are likely to suffer from low numbers of observations. 
1.5.2 Explanations of Predicted and Unpredicted Results 
Quantitative models using complied data indicate that major policy banks 
are affected by market factors, such as GDP per capita of recipient countries. As 
major state-owned actors with strategic goals stated in their company profiles, the 
Chinese and Japanese ECAs still consider the economic condition of recipient 
countries. In terms of anomalies, where the banks grant loans to recipients with 
negative economic prospect, the contradictory correlations generally show that 
despite the less favorable environment in recipient countries, governmental loans 
are still issued in the hope of facilitating cooperation. On the other hand, the risk-
seeking behavior of banks contradicts prediction, but it can be explained by the 
fact that most of the energy loans of the three policy banks finance projects in 
developing countries. It is unclear whether it is true risk-seeking tendency, or late-
comer disadvantage that forces banks to finance deals with higher risks. The 
following section offers alternative explanations to the unexpected discoveries in 
                                                   
11Information gained in follow-up interview of Chinese NGO scholars, it is also observed in 
databases such as AidData and CGEF. The division of labor is never explicitly mentioned in 
documents, as both CHEXIM and CDB are responsible for financing a wide spectrum of sectors. 
CHEXIM is theoretically responsible for financing all types of Chinese overseas trade and 
finance, and CDB lacks clear documented guidance in overseas operation. 
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statistical models. 
First, the negative correlations between (logged) loans and R&D 
expenditure in the CHEXIM model can be explained by the emergence of 
alternative energy and technology seeking motivation. The majority of energy 
loans from Chinese banks are granted to large state-owned companies 
specializing in fossil fuels and hydroelectric power. Fossil fuel trades do not 
increase as technology improves; instead, they might decrease as technological 
advancement increases energy efficiency. In China’s case, large state-owned 
traditional energy companies are more likely to receive loans in comparison to 
smaller, newly emerging alternative energy companies because of their credit 
histories. As a result, R&D investment leads to a decrease in energy loans focused 
on traditional energy. Another explanation is that some of the Chinese energy 
investment in the past decade, such as wind and solar greenfield investment in 
Europe (Curran, Lv, & Spigarelli, 2017), are technology-seeking investments that 
will decrease as domestic technology improves.  
Second, the negative correlation between GDP growth or population growth 
and energy loans in all models can be explained by the nature of energy projects 
and their business cycles, which further confirms some of the non-market 
characteristics of these banks. When prices and income are on the upswing, the 
private sector will be more apt to invest to take advantage of higher returns, but is 
also less likely to do so during downturns. Energy loans usually involve 
infrastructure projects and can be considered as overseas expenditures in public 
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projects that are usually the responsibility of government. If the recipient country 
has a low GDP growth rate, the country is experiencing an economic slowdown 
and might cut expenditures on public projects. Energy projects from foreign 
contractors matching foreign capital might provide a more cost-efficient alternative 
to governmental expenditures, as private capital during economic downturns is 
less likely to provide sufficient capital for public projects. In the absence of private 
capital and public capital from recipient countries, foreign public capital (such as 
loans provided by ECAs) is used to finance the desired projects in recipient 
countries. In addition, energy deals, such as the Sino-Russian gas contract in 2009 
and China’s financial support to Brazilian petroleum giant Petrobras in 2015-16, 
might provide a substantial financial boost to recipient countries during an 
economic downturn. For example, Petrobras sought 3.5 billion credit facilities from 
the Chinese policy bank in 2015, but the Chinese bank only came in after the 
company failed to gather sufficient private market subscriptions due to accusations 
of corruption and delays in financial disclosure. This is a typical case where 
governmental financial institutions advance despite the poor market prospects of 
the recipient country. Additionally, this case is considered to be somewhat political 
as Petrobras claimed that the deal would be “strengthening cooperation between 
the economies of both countries.”12 
Third, the negative correlation between Governance Indicators and energy 
                                                   
12Petrobras, Funding Agreement of USD 5 billion with China Development Bank Corporation, May 
2015, http://www.investidorpetrobras.com.br/en/press-releases/funding-agreement-usd-5-billion-
china-development-bank-corporation 
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loans can be observed in both the Chinese and Japanese models, indicating a 
potential tendency of JBIC and CHEXIM to invest in more politically fragile 
countries. This can be explained in various ways: First, the resource-abundant 
recipients are more likely to conduct energy trade with investor countries and they 
are more susceptible to the “Dutch Disease,” in which more “fragile” authoritarian 
leaders might solidify their rule using the economic gains from energy exports. 
Second, studies such as O’Donnell (1977) argue that authoritarianism might attract 
direct foreign investment as rent seeking is easier, which in turn increases the 
demand for loans. Finally, since the role of export credit agencies includes 
supporting trades and investments in politically risky areas where private capital is 
absent, it is possible that these banks specifically grant loans to politically unstable 
countries. This also explains the relationship between vote alignment and 
Japanese loans, as developing and developed countries in the UN council tend to 
vote differently on various issues. 
1.6 Conclusion 
 Export credit agencies (ECAs) are state agencies offering financial support 
for economic activities. These institutions exist widely among major economies 
and might take the form of export-import banks or other agencies. Some countries, 
such as China and Japan, have much larger ECAs compared to other countries 
and make extensive use of these agencies in overseas economic activities. The 
unprecedentedly large size of CHEXIM and CDB has also resulted in the opinion 
that these banks are more of a state agency than a market-oriented capital 
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provider. The opinion further leads to the common perception that the Chinese 
economic expansion in recent years is supported by the government.  
Chinese overseas economic activities have drawn international attention, 
and external critics often assume that the Chinese projects are state-funded. A 
comparative study is therefore important to study the true characteristics of 
Chinese economic expansion and to clarify misunderstandings.  
In response to the question about the similarities and differences of Chinese 
economic activities compared to its foreign counterparts, this study constructs a 
model for energy loans that includes various theories determining loan approval in 
state-owned policy banks. JBIC was selected for comparison as the Japanese 
bank with the largest export-import bank aside from Chinese ECAs and a major 
energy loan provider with a similar amount of energy loans to CHEXIM and CDB 
from 2006 to 2015. CHEXIM, CDB and JBIC are chosen because they are the 
world’s largest providers of other official flow, including loans and Chinese 
concessional loans, to all developmental sectors. This study contributes to the 
existing discussion, because there has not been a quantitative comparison 
between Chinese policy banks and other banks. This study also utilizes a relatively 
new database of Chinese energy loans. 
The loan approval process for both Chinese and Japanese banks is 
significantly influenced by the recipient country’s domestic market, indicating that 
the policy banks in both countries respond positively to market demands for capital. 
On the other hand, almost all the included Chinese and Japanese banks show 
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certain tendencies that cannot be solely explained by the market. For example, 
they respond positively to the national wealth of recipient countries but show a 
certain level of tolerance to political and economic risks. In addition, policy banks 
respond positively to negative market prospects, such as declining GDP per capita 
or population growth. While contradicting the market-based theories, the risk-
tolerant behavior can be explained by the nature of public capital; when private 
capital is discouraged by risk, these major policy banks offer other official flow as 
a replacement. These discoveries indicate that both Chinese and Japanese ECAs 
are similarly influenced by both market and non-market factors. 
 The regression models might support the claim that the Chinese ECAs 
actively support current Chinese overseas expansion. However, it does not find 
evidence of “resource grabbing” in the energy sector aside from a few major deals 
between CDB and specific energy exporters, as the amount energy loan is not 
significantly affected by resource dependence of home country in most models. 
While this study is restricted to the energy sector, the conclusion still bears policy 
relevance, because energy is a key area in which China is presumed to act 
differently from other overseas investors. While Japan is considered an “outlier” by 
classical economists, the study still demonstrates that both Chinese and Japanese 
banks have non-market goals as well as market-based concerns. In addition, the 
study contributes to the argument that the current Chinese development model is 
not as unique as recent media reports suggest, but a continuity of post-WWII Asian 
development models. 
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As this study mostly uses factors that can be observed externally, it does 
not capture the dynamics of domestic politics and cannot fully explain how certain 
determinants, such as China’s energy dependence, are integrated into bank-
specific loan policies and risk assessments. A follow-up study on the domestic 
decision-making process will contribute to a more detailed picture.  
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Chapter 2 Investing with Risks: A Comparative Study of Energy 
Investments by Chinese and Japanese State-owned Financiers 
2.1 Introduction 
 Japan and China have the biggest public financiers13 in the world, which are 
often involved in countries with high instability. Both countries have state-funded 
investments, such as San Roque in Philippines and Myitsone dam in Myanmar, 
that result in loss of national capital and negative reputations of the investor 
country. These projects in highly unstable recipients (hosts) can be considered as 
“risky” investments from the perspective of investor (home) country: while the 
state-owned banks can use various methods to mitigate economic loss, these 
projects often impose risks on public assets and interests. Is investing in risky 
projects via state-owned financiers a clear decision of the investor government or 
an unintended result? The study aims to explore the mechanisms behind the 
implementation, change or suspension of risky projects funded by public 
financiers. 
In contrast to abundant studies that focus solely on China, there have been 
limited comparative studies that integrate the Chinese model into broader 
development theories due to a few difficulties. First, the emergence of Chinese 
overseas investment is a relatively recent phenomenon, with investment cases 
understudied and data largely unavailable. Second, Chinese state-supported 
                                                   
13 These banks include China Development Bank (CDB), China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM), 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA). JICA focuses on granting foreign aid known as official development aid (ODA), and it is 
not a main focus of this study. 
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investments operate differently from their western counterparts, with 
characteristics such as focus on infrastructure and lack of conditionality  (Chin & 
Gallagher, 2019). As a result, Chinese development finance is often considered as 
a different approach to the western development finance. However, China’s state 
support to overseas economic activities share similarities with public finance in late 
development models. 
As a well-studied case of a state-led late-development model, Japan offers 
a middle ground for a comparative study with China. Differentiating Japan’s state-
supported financing model and China’s model provides valuable insights into 
China’s current investment practices. Japan and China are both late-developing 
countries with large state-owned financial institutions; both countries tend to 
heavily invest in infrastructure and energy projects, which are especially 
susceptible to environmental and social risk due to their impact on the local 
community. Both countries actively support overseas investments and projects, 
occasionally including projects with high risk. Comparing Japan’s risk 
management with China’s will therefore offer insight to unique characteristics of 
current Chinese investment and integrate the Chinese model into the larger 
political and economic picture.  
The study raises an interest group theory and uses five cases with high 
innate risk to illustrate how Chinese and Japanese policy banks balance between 
market interests and governmental assignments. The study uses both interviews 
and archives to trace the development of various projects and frames existing 
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theories into a circle model of different stakeholders. It concludes that as the 
projects were proposed by recipient countries and investor countries only reacted 
to accidents via political channels, the policy banks maintain a high degree of 
autonomy in overseas operations. The study further argues that, while economic 
statecraft might exist as a potential driver of investment in risky projects, the self-
interest of banks and host governments is the more important driver. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The motivation of state agents is the key question about investing in 
recipients with high risk. Existing studies propose three models of government’s 
role in economic activities, which determines potential drivers of policy banks: the 
market model, in which investors and recipients use market-based negotiations 
and contracts to determine investment; the statist model, in which the state use 
political negotiations, agents or market intervention to arrange investment and 
accept risk as a trade-off for national interests; and the interest group model, in 
which state policy reflects the bargaining outcome among interest groups. The 
market model does not focus on state intervention so this study will therefore focus 
on statist and interest group theories. 
2.2.1 Market Theories 
Market theories are economic theories that assume investors, including for-
profit public financiers, are driven by profit while investing in overseas projects. 
Popular drivers of overseas investment and trade include: the oversaturation 
(Akamatsu, 1962) and industrial upgrade (Vernon, 1966) of domestic markets, the 
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convenience and “internalization of cost” (Dunning, 1976) (Dunning, 1988) of 
building factories in recipient or export platform countries, and the lack of resources 
in home countries (Reuber et al, 1973) (Yoshino, 1976). Naturally these theories 
cannot explain the investment in projects with high risk, but some studies imply 
that state agents are more risk-tolerant as they are subsidized by the government 
(Buckley, et al., 2007). In practice, the policy banks, including those in western 
countries, are designed to support investments whose risk discourages private 
financiers. This is often considered a distortion of market. 
2.2.2 Statist Theories 
There are two types of theories that treat the state as an independent actor 
that purposefully promotes overseas investment for either political or economic 
goals. These theories are often used to explain Chinese investment, as the 
perceived unique characteristic of current Chinese overseas investment is a state 
with “strategic” goals. These theories treat the state as an actor with an 
independent set of goals and the capability to act coherently and consistently.  
a) Statecraft Theories 
Statecraft theories argue that states intervene in the market for political 
reasons. The definition of statecraft is similar but different among the literature. 
Recent literature on China’s economic expansion often define statecraft (or 
“economic diplomacy,” Mandarin 经济外交 in Chinese discourse) as the use of 
economic tools of national power for strategic non-economic, diplomatic or 
   37 
security-related goals of the state (Norris, 2016) (Li & Sun, Understanding China's 
Economic Diplomacy, 2014). Older literature on economic statecraft generally 
observe various economic leverages of a strong economic power that can be used 
to gain political advantage (Hirschman A. O., 1945), such as unbalanced bilateral 
trade (Baldwin, 1971) and sanctions (Baldwin & Pape, 1998) (Rowe, 2001), 
although some claim that such tools are ineffective (Pape R. , 1997). This view has 
been addressed when strong powers such as the United States and the United 
Nations impose sanctions on weaker powers. 
Recent cases of Chinese overseas investments have different implications 
on risky investment. On the one hand, investments – regardless of social and 
environmental risks - are often considered as positive statecraft to facilitate certain 
national goals (Norris, 2016) including political goals such as support on disputes 
(Reilly, 2013), economic strategic goals such as energy security (Alves, 2013), and 
soft powers (Barutigam & Tang, 2012). Some studies suggest that economic 
cooperation contributes to the creation of a common agenda in international 
politics (Piccone, 2016). On the other hand, empirical studies on various Chinese 
projects might imply that the presumed Chinese statecraft is either exaggerated or 
ineffective (such as SiuSue & Zhang, 2017) due to the Chinese government having 
conflicting goals (Brautigam, 2009), which might imply that (1) some overseas 
projects are driven by profit instead of state goals, (2) the investor state cannot 
prevent a presumed “resource-grabbing” or “environmentally damaging” project in 
order to avoid a negative reputation.  
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b) Development State Theories 
Some development economists argue that the state might use public capital 
to boost the competitiveness of companies,  a theory also referred to as “state 
capitalism” or “corporatism” (Unger & Chan, Corporatism in China: A 
Developmental State in an East Asian Context, 1996) in the literature. This rhetoric 
is seen in the argument that Chinese state capital provides unfair advantage to 
Chinese companies in open competition (Reddy, 2011). Gerschenkron noticed the 
common use of market intervention in backward economies in 1962 
(Gerschenkron, 1962), but this school mostly originated from Chalmers Johnson’s 
study on Japan (Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial 
Policy, 1978) and later extended to other East and Southeast Asian economies 
such as Korea (Amsden A. H., 1992) and Taiwan (Wade, 1990). Developmental 
states would treat state support in risky projects as an intentional strategy to 
subsidize companies and to create business opportunity. 
Some theories suggest that the state uses policies to facilitate overseas 
economic expansion. The state can improve the regional economic ecology for 
outbound economic activities (Kojima, A Pacific Economic Community and Asian 
Developing Countries, 1966) (Okita, 1985) and strategically guide domestic 
companies (Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial 
Policy, 1978) and overcome market failures (Amsden & Chu, 2001). The cases of 
East Asian economies investing in Southeast Asian countries indicate that the 
state goal is to invest in less developed recipients, which tend to have higher 
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economic and political instability — the risk-seeking tendency is a side effect. 
Development state theories are consistent with the “natural” stages of 
economic development, but overall stress on the active role of the state. Economic 
development theories explaining overseas investment and trade via models such 
as market seeking, resource seeking (also related to comparative advantage), 
production cycle and export platforming. Economic development theories focusing 
on post-WWII late-developing Asian economies, such as Korea, the Four Tigers 
and Japan, often notice that governments support enterprises with policies and 
financial instruments; some governments such as Japan may have the capability 
to shape the development of industries. After the oil crises, the state need for 
energy security is often consistent with the market need for energy resources. As 
a result, overseas investments in oil and gas fields and resource trade are 
occasionally supported by governmental agencies.   
2.2.3 Interest Group Theories 
Various theories suggest that the state is fragmented, and the overseas 
economic policies of the state reflects individual or bureaucratic interests instead 
of state interest. These theories argue that state-financed economic activities can 
be driven by various motivations depending on the bargain among different actors. 
In both recipient and investor countries, the policy outcome (whether to support a 
certain project) can be developmental policy, economic diplomacy, or other 
policies representing the interests of specific groups.  
a) State as a Bargaining Platform 
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Most of the pluralism theories do not consider the state as an independent 
actor and instead treat it as an arena. Pluralism is influenced by group theory that 
treats domestic politics as a “black box” system of demanding and supporting 
groups (Easton, 1953). In terms of overseas economic policy, pluralism is 
influenced by the international trade theory that international trade and investment 
(Frieden, 1991) benefit and harm different groups of producers. Classical pluralism 
considers the government as a platform where interest groups use various forms 
of resources to “acquire control over others” or “gain autonomy” (Dahl, 1978). 
Interest groups form social alliances (Gourevitch, 1986) (Rogowski, 1989) that 
constantly shift according to the agenda (Polsby, 1980). The later emerged elite 
pluralism considers some elite groups with various resources to be more influential 
than others (Schattschneider, 1960) and can create public policy based on group 
interest (Schattschneider, 1933). Both pluralist interest groups and elite groups 
face the problem of collective action (Olson, 1965) (Alt & Gilligan, 1992) and 
imperfect information (Lasswell, 1951). Some case studies suggest that interest 
groups may set up policies to compensate short-term loss and externalize risk 
(Calder, 2017). Calder’s study on Japanese domestic policy formation proposes a 
model of “circle of compensation” and argues that, in repeating games among 
actors, even conflicting groups might reach an agreement to overlook short-term 
loss if they are expect compensation in the long term. As his studies largely include 
the infrastructure of power generation projects with short-term negative impacts 
and long-term benefits, Calder’s model can also be applied to analyzing 
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transnational bargaining of infrastructure or energy projects. 
b) State as an Embedded Actor 
Meanwhile, some interest group theories treat the government as an 
advantageous policy promoter among interest groups. They seek a middle ground 
between state-based models and pluralist models, arguing that the state is an 
independent actor in interest group politics. Due to its advantageous position, it is 
possible that the state forces other stakeholders to implement statecraft or late-
development policies.  
Neo-pluralism not only stresses on the uneven distribution of resources 
among social groups (Manley, 1983), but also argues that the state is an 
autonomous actor. Corporatism theories suggest that a conglomeration of 
corporate groups make political decisions while excluding the participation of other 
groups. Neo-pluralism is based on the observations of dominating social groups in 
different historical periods, and in turn influenced the practice of various countries, 
including the “economic democracy” in Germany and Scandinavia (Hall & Soskice, 
2001) (Martin & Swanks, 2012), statist social control (Mazower, 2000), and the 
“guild system” similar to the practice of medieval manufacturers.  
c) Interest Group Theories in Developmental State 
Studies on the influence of the state on overseas financial activities lead to 
different conclusions: the state fails to regulate overseas agents and crowd out 
private enterprises by subsidizing state agents competing with them (Ye, 2017), 
or, relative financial autonomy in capitalist states – regardless of whether it is 
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domestic or overseas activities - is an inevitable decision of the state to moderate 
between interest (Poulantzas, 1978). In terms of overseas activities where the 
investor countries have limited influence on economic policy, interest groups in the 
domestic country have direct influence on investors. Such influence range from the 
bargaining structure defined by veto players (Tsebelis, 2002) to the presence of 
other social groups (Jensen, et al., 2012).  
The state capitalist government can bargain with interest groups, thus 
forming policies that benefit some groups. Solis’ 2004 study on Japanese sunset 
industries shows a typical pattern of governmental intervention where 
governmental subsides are (a) heavily influenced by the lobbying of domestic 
interest groups; (b) most effective when the subsidy successfully raise the 
competitiveness of domestic producers; and (c) less effective when the industry is 
already internationally competitive or still uncompetitive even with the subsidy. 
Calder’s study on Japanese domestic politics suggests that, in repeat bargaining, 
some actors will take a short term loss if they expect to gain in long term (Calder, 
2017); these repeating games form a “circle of compensation” where stakeholders 
gain in the long run and externalize negative impacts of policies to excluded 
groups. Combining these two studies, it is possible that policy banks can be 
subsidized to invest in certain countries with high risk or undertake risk and expect 
future gains in other deals. It is also possible that the host government, investor, 
and some stakeholders externalize negative impact to other groups. 
Recent studies on Chinese overseas investment show evidence that state-
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supported overseas activities can be influenced by various factors, including third-
party groups that influence the behavioral norms of Chinese state agents (Ba, 
2006), the enforcement of local regulation (Fearnside & Figueiredo, 2017), and the 
restraints from local communities (Lleras & Leal, 2017). Studies on certain 
recipient countries, such as Myanmar (SiuSue & Zhang, 2017), also suggest that 
the overseas investments are heavily driven by the autonomy of Chinese state 
agents. Siusue and Zhang’s studies on Myanmar also indicate that some of the 
investments negatively influence Sino-Myanmar relationship, which contradicts the 
goal of Chinese government to maintain strong bilateral ties. Still, most of the 
projects in these studies are completed with the local group joining the bargain or 
being coerced to accept the project. Studies on failed projects, such as Myitsone 
dam, attribute the failure of projects mostly to domestic interest groups within 
recipient country (Kiik, 2016) and the inability of investors to influence interest 
group politics (Chan, 2017). In summary, most of the studies on domestic 
regulation address the fragmented nature of governance in China, whereas studies 
on overseas investment often notice the ineffectiveness of the Chinese 
government to influence overseas investment. 
2.3 Research Design 
 This study analyzes cases of “investments with high risk” to explore the 
motivations behind such investments and to test various schools of theories. In a 
previous quantitative comparison between Chinese and Japanese policy banks, 
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models using energy loans14 recently from China and Japan indicate that policy 
banks might be driven by both profit and statist goals. The study finds that policy 
banks are partly profit-driven, but banks of both countries tend to invest in 
recipients with high risks. It is unclear whether policy banks invest in countries with 
high risk to pursue profit, or if they invest in these countries because of political 
tasks assigned by investor governments.  
To answer the question above, this study combines interview inputs with 
multiple cases of Japanese and Chinese investment to summarize the patterns of 
risk management in both countries. The interviews include formal (physical 
records) and informal interviews (often off-record) with over 40 bank officials, 
overseas investment experts, researchers and employees of companies 
involved.15 The interviews use hypothetical scenarios and regulatory questions to 
provide a general picture of risk prevention, risk management and accountability,16 
yet they do not touch specific projects due to most projects being considered as 
confidential. In addition to interviews, this study uses archives (mostly news 
reports) to track the process of events. This study uses online search engines and 
                                                   
14 Not counting foreign aid defined by the OECD. This study chose energy loans because this is 
the most comparable sector in terms of the amount of loans; the modelling was explained in a 
separate paper.  
15 The experts are selected based on either of two qualifications: first-hand experience to work in 
one of the involved financial institutions, or long-term observations of regional economic activities 
or of policy banks. The pool of potential interviewees is already limited, and it is further limited by 
the willingness of current officials to share knowledge. Dozens of preliminary informal interviews 
and discussions are used to widen the range of potential candidates. 
16 The questionnaires are divided into different categories for researchers, bank officials, etc. The 
original purpose of the interviews was to explore bank regulation, which is a separate study; 
however, each set of 10 questions have 2-3 questions about an actual overseas investment 
where an accident happened, or a hypothetical scenario if the interviewees refuse to touch case 
details. 
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news archives such as Nexi Uni to gather reports, official documents and other 
supportive documents. This supportive evidence on specific projects is mostly from 
archives of news reports, governmental announcements, government documents 
and NGO observations. 
 The cases aim to embody a representation of typical risky projects. They 
are selected from the Environmental Justice Atlas database, a public database of 
projects with environmental and often social risks. Jointly supported by the 
European Union and several academic institutions, the database has over 2700 
entries of socially and environmentally “risky” projects categorized according to the 
level of violence (Temper et al, 2018). In addition to the involvement of one of the 
Chinese or Japanese policy banks,17 this study chooses cases with a “medium” 
level of crisis and involvement of at least one of the policy banks. This study uses 
a combination of interviews and case studies to present how actors are involved 
in an overseas project, how they respond to an accident, and how different 
regulatory structures influence the interaction among stakeholders.  
 The literature suggests multiple competing hypotheses about the role of 
investor governments and investor agents (companies and banks) in overseas 
investment: 
• Statecraft theories argue that economic tools can be used to punish 
international rivals and reward allies. As a result, the theory would expect 
                                                   
17 In the case of Japan, policy banks experienced a series of reforms. Both current banks and 
their predecessors are used in the search. 
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the investor government to promote a project in political allies and halt the 
project once the bilateral relationship deteriorates. While positive statecraft 
is often addressed in China’s overseas expansion, it is also possible for 
China to withdraw economic cooperation as a political punishment. For 
example, China’s importation of Norwegian salmon dropped after the Nobel 
Committee awarded the Chinese activist Liu Xiaobo (Beam, 2013). 
• Developmental state theories argue that the state supports national 
companies because overseas economic activities are important to the 
economic development of the investor country. The flying geese model 
based on Japan implies that government can promote regional economic 
cooperation. Solis’ study (Solis, 2004) also indicates that governmental 
support to industries boosts their competitiveness. 
• Economic theories generally consider for-profit actors – which include state 
agents – to be driven by profit when operating in the market. Risks are 
mitigated via in-market means such as commercial insurance. 
These hypotheses are all possible drivers for overseas public finance, but 
the conflicting goals often compete in overseas operations. Based on interest 
group theories, this study argues that various groups that can be divided into four 
categories – local residents and activists of resistance (R), host governments (G), 
international investors (contractors and financiers) (I), and investor governments 
(F). As this study’s focus is investments in projects with high risk, it is self-evident 
that the investor supports the project, whereas the resistance groups oppose the 
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project. The host government has tools and incentives to either support the project 
or to suspend it. The host government also includes multiple agencies that are 
constantly bargaining, with some more likely to promote trade and others more 
likely to support local community or environmental preservation.  
From the perspective of interest groups, the term “environmental risk” is 
often accompanied by social risk.18 Environmental impacts tend to have social 
consequences, which can vary from the destruction of historical sites to a decrease 
in agricultural production, to the incitement of local resistance. 
The key to test this argument is to identify key moments during a project in 
which all actors are present and influence each other, and to compare successful 
projects with failed projects. The major difference between statist theories and the 
proposed framework is the role of investor government (F) in a couple of key ways. 
First, statecraft theory would expect the state to act as an active promoter in the 
formation of a project. Second, the development state theory would predict that the 
project would benefit the economic development of the investor country — based 
on the Japanese experience, this often implies that the investor government is 
essentially creating overseas business opportunities. As the figure below shows, 
statecraft or the developmental state model implies an active role of the investor 
government as the “promoter” of projects and as the “protector” of businesses at 
risk. 
                                                   
18 This is based on the observation that corporate responsibility often combines social 
responsibility with environmental responsibility in practice (such as Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001), 
and the observation from the EJ Atlas database that environmental risk is accompanied by social 
resistance toward the project. 
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FIGURE 2.1 THE ROLE OF INVESTOR GOVERNMENTS SUGGESTED BY 
HOME-DRIVEN THEORIES 
 
However, existing cases, such as the Myitsone dam, suggest that the 
investor countries can be powerless in the bargain, and the result of projects are 
mostly determined by the interaction among the host government, investors and 
resistance (the R-G-I triangle of bargaining). The statist models stress the role of 
the recipient country; in such cases, evidence such as bilateral agreements before 
the project proposal and active intervention of recipient politics by the investor 
country should be present. Most of the following cases show the opposite, in which 
the investor countries did not actively promote the projects. One case even shows 
that the investor country refused to settle disputes even when requested, and 
another case shows that the investor country has limited influence even when it 
made diplomatic efforts to protect state agents.  
This study argues that the formation and implementation of the project is 
mostly determined by the interactions between foreign capital, host governments, 
and local resistance groups. To be specific, the host governments (G) heavily 
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determine the approval and progression of a project, as they have regulatory 
authority over both investors and residents and if the local resistance opposes a 
project, they have to interact with the host government. The relationship can be 
shown in the figure below, which heavily stresses the R-G-I triangle of bargaining. 
While the investor countries are sometimes involved in the progression of the 
project, their channel of influence is limited. This is especially true in the case of 
China, which has a non-interference policy that might empower the host 
government (Gonzalez-Vicente, The limits to China's non-interference foreign 
policy: pro-state interventionism and the rescaling of economic governance, 2015). 
In addition, despite state shareholding and ownership of policy banks, the investor 
government suffers from inefficient and reactive regulation over their agents. 
FIGURE 2.2 PROPOSED INTERACTION MODEL FOR JAPANESE AND 
CHINESE CASES 
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 The following sections, using interviews and archives about five completed 
or suspended investments with innate high levels of social and environmental risk, 
track the progress of a project and present evidence of each decisive moment. 
This study argues that the evidence of statist policy from investor governments is 
relatively weak, whereas other events contradict counterfactual scenarios of 
home-driven investment theories. 
2.4 Japanese Cases of Risk Management 
 As the major public financier of Japan, JBIC is considered as more risk-
tolerant than private capital by commercial bank officials. The predecessors of  
JBIC – including Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), the old JBIC and Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) – provided public finance to energy-related 
infrastructure projects with inherent environment and social risk. Similar to current 
Chinese public financiers, the predecessors of JBIC encountered protests from 
NGOs and local communities, as well as lawsuits when financing overseas 
projects. Both of the selected cases are located in Southeast Asia, which has been 
a major region of Japanese investment. 
2.4.1 Koto Panjang Dam 
Koto Panjang dam is a relatively small multipurpose dam (114MW) located 
on Kampar Kanan and Mahat Rivers on western Sumatra, between the West 
Sumatra and Riau provinces of Indonesia. The project is criticized as affected 
residents were “given no chance to participate in decisions regarding the dam, nor 
on plans for resettlement and compensation” (RWESA et al., 2003). The project 
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resulted in the resettlement of several nearby villages and risked the lives of 4886 
families in 10 villages (Karimi et al, 2014). 
 Japan has been a traditional investor in Indonesia since the 1960s, and was 
criticized for neglecting social and environmental standards before the proposal of 
Koto Panjang (Permataseri, 1992). The Indonesian state-owned company 
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) proposed the project in 1979 as a small dam, 
and the feasibility studies were conducted by Japanese consulting company 
TEPSCO in 1980 (Suara Kampar, 2017). TEPSCO proposed a large dam instead, 
and Japanese governmental financial agencies joined the preparation of the 
project in 1981. The Japanese government contributed to the project in several 
direct ways, but a variety of indirect influences are critical. First, the project counts 
as official development assistance as opposed to other official flows. Secondly, the 
Japanese plan of “doubling ODA” in 1977 granted subsidy to consultative 
companies such as TEPSCO, facilitating their overseas activities (Choi & Han, 
2011).  Finally, the Japanese government signed a note exchange agreement with 
the Indonesian government in December 1990 despite domestic criticism to the 
environmentally harmful project. An Indonesian state-owned company and a 
Japanese consulting company were the active promoters of the dam. 
Facing environmental and social pressure, OECF made certain efforts to 
ensure human rights, such as holding up a 250 million USD loan to ensure the 
Indonesian government had a compensation plan for 15,000 affected residents 
(Balls, 1991), and attaching environmental conditionality to the project 
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(Permataseri, 1992). However, the Japanese bank could not enforce 
compensation to affected residents, therefore impacting the implementation of 
resettlement. Local communities were largely left outside of the negotiations, with 
only some village leaders participating in the negotiations with the Indonesian 
company (RWESA et al., 2003). Moreover, residents also faced imitation and 
coercion from the Indonesian military (RWESA et al., 2003)and they claimed to 
receive less compensation than promised, as some lands for resettlement were 
unsuitable for agriculture (Karimi & Taifur, 2013) or already occupied (Permataseri, 
1992). 
The resettlement and compensation were supposed to be jointly provided 
by the Indonesian government and OECF with the package including arable land, 
rubber plantations (provided by the government) and related infrastructures (by 
OECF). However, studies indicated that, while OECF indeed provided water and 
electricity to resettlements, the overall living standard of many residents 
deteriorated because of the project and unequal compensation (Karimi et al, 2014). 
While the Japanese investors made efforts to reduce the social and environmental 
impact before the loan was distributed, because it could not control the 
implementation of settled compensation, the investor’s effort in preventing social 
and environmental harm was inefficient. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government itself refused to get further involved 
in local disputes. Representatives from Riau provinces appealed to the Indonesian 
and Japanese governments to demand villager participation but did not gain 
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support from either government. As the Indonesian government neglected local 
complains, residents sued Japanese companies and financiers in Japanese 
courts. In addition to compensation, the residents also demand environmental 
restoration such as restoring river flows and protecting species (RWESA et al., 
2003). The Tokyo District Court rejected the demand of compensation from Koto 
Panjang residents in 2009. The judge Yasushi Nakamura concluded that “the 
resident’s relocation was a matter for the Indonesian government” (Jiji Press Ltd, 
2009) and that the “Japanese government did not have a legal duty to the 
residents” (Japan Times, 2015). The organizational rearrangement of JICA and 
JBIC during this time did not significantly affect the ruling. The demand was 
rejected by the Tokyo High Court in 2012 and by the Supreme Court in 2015, both 
supporting the finding of the District Court. While the Indonesian residents vowed 
to seek Indonesian and international support from institutions such as the National 
Commission on Human Rights (Jb, 2015), there is no documented result of further 
action against the Japanese ruling from NGOs.  
This is an instance where parts of the home government are requested to 
intervene in a disputed project and statist theories would predict a more active role 
of the state to mitigate risk or protect its companies. However, the Japanese court 
explicitly stated its intention to leave the dispute to the host country (the R-G-I 
triangle), which provided a for-profit case where no statecraft was found in the 
investment. 
To some extent, the Japanese government supported the project by 
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allowing an official assistance agency (OECF) to finance the project. However, the 
project was mostly promoted by the consulting company TEPSCO and supported 
by the host government and the Japanese judges decided to leave the disputes to 
the host. The case also shows that the investor, while holding its environmental 
and social concerns using conditionality, has limited motivation or capability to 
intervene on behalf of local resistance. 
2.4.2 San Roque Dam 
The San Roque Multipurpose Project, also known as San Roque Dam, is 
financed by the other predecessor of JBIC – the Export-Import Bank of Japan. 
Located on the Agno River in Cordillera region, Pangasinan province, this dam 
was much bigger than Koto Panjang; San Roque is the largest dam in the 
Philippines and the 16th largest dam in the world. This is a case where neither the 
investors nor their government had much influence over construction, and where 
the resistance group was strong enough to influence the host government and 
force investors to compromise. As a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project, the 
project was constructed by Japan and US-funded San Roque Power Corporation 
(SRPC) and later transferred to a Filipino company. The construction of San Roque 
Dam has incited protests within the Philippines due to residents’ fear of siltation 
(Rosenbaum, 2000). The protests, which were supported by organized local 
resistance, eventually caused JBIC to make a compromise by halting the 
remaining loan (BusinessWorld, 2002). The Japanese government, while facing 
domestic criticism on the environmental risks, was less involved. 
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Unlike Koto Panjang, the project was not an official ODA program and was 
co-financed by Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) and private capital. JEXIM 
(and its successor JBIC) played a more indirect role as one of the shareholders of 
the contractor SRPC, which is jointly owned by various US and Japanese private 
investors. JEXIM and later JBIC co-financed the dam together with private 
Japanese banks, lending a total of 1.19 billion USD. In practice, Filipino protesters 
mainly targeted JBIC due to its leading position among financers, responsibility of 
distributing compensation, and its commitment to OECD guidelines. However, the 
actual construction was mainly carried out by US companies such as Sithe Energy, 
United Engineers International Inc. and Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd. As one 
of the shareholders of the contractor, JEXIM/JBIC have limited influence over the 
construction. 
The protests started around 1999 due to environmental impacts and the 
coerced eviction of about 900 families (Bengwayan, 2017). Unlike the Koto 
Panjang case, where only the affected villagers protested, the Filipino protesters 
were already organized due to their constant struggle with foreign contractors. Due 
to the lack of skilled local workers, the project was mostly handled by foreign 
engineers from private companies, which incited Filipino nationalism during 
constructor-resident conflicts (Rosenbaum, 2000). Local movements such as the 
Peasant Movement to Free the Agno River, Cordillera People´s Alliance and the 
Shalupirip Santahnay Indigenous Peoples Movement jointly resisted foreign 
constructors. The local communities also had a history of violent resistance before 
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the San Roque protests, which often involved the extrajudicial killing of leading 
activists, resulting in international pressure on the Filipino government (Remollino, 
2009). The resistance against San Roque intensified after the assassination of 
Jose Doton, a leader of several groups fighting against the dam (Cordillera 
People's Alliance, 2006). 
In addition, the resistance managed to align its own interests with 
governmental interests, eventually working with the Arroyo administration to 
restrain the project in a number of key ways. First, they avoided direct confrontation 
by criticizing the Filipino partner of SRPC for compromising national interests, as 
the Filipino state-owned company needed to fully pay the contractor regardless of 
power output (Bengwayan, 2017). These characteristics differ from the recipient-
government conflict over the implementation of compensation in the Koto Panjang 
case. Second, the resistance focused on the illegal practices of investors, which 
persuaded the new administration to tighten regulations on investors. In 1998, the 
vice president of SRPC admitted that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
provided by NPC was altered by the Filipino company and officials, which violated 
Filipino law as neither local government approval nor local consensus were 
gathered (Bengwayan, 2017). Meanwhile, the protesters accused JBIC of violating 
the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), as the project was not approved by the 
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and no consent of affected 
residents was obtained. JBIC was specifically held responsible because the 
construction also violated an OECD agreement that “projects should comply with 
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standards of the host country” (OECD, 2001) and a JBIC Memorandum of 
Understanding of compliance with local regulation (International Rivers, 2002). 
JBIC was also accused of failing to deliver the promised levels of compensation 
and of failing to prevent high rates of sedimentation. In 2002, president Arroyo 
ordered an inter-ministerial committee to investigate independent power producer 
contracts, which listed San Roque dam as one of the projects with severe legal 
and financial issues (The Philippine Star, 2002). These efforts led to the Filipino 
government demanding to re-negotiate a transparent and fair deal — a Filipino 
legislator even travelled to Japan to demand a suspension of funding (Kakuchi, 
2000). 
Facing a combination of local resistance, opposition from the host 
government, and pressure from domestic environmentalists (Water Power & Dam 
Construction, 2002), JBIC has compromised and refused to fully disburse the 
promised finance to the dam component (Dumlao, 2007).19 While construction of 
the dam itself is completed, the San Roque case shows that the investor can be 
forced to compromise when the host government are persuaded by organized 
resistance to re-negotiate. Also, San Roque is a case that represents a type of 
investment where the investor does not effectively control the implementation of 
the project and is therefore unable to interact with host governments and recipients 
to mitigate risk.  
                                                   
19 The insufficient investment is reported to be financed by CHEXIM, with no further incident 
reported. 
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2.5 Chinese Cases of Risk Management 
 While not bounded by OECD guidelines, Chinese policy banks such as 
CHEXIM have their own guidelines on evaluating environment and social risk: 
adopting the host country standard, but gradually moving toward the OECD 
conditionality.20 However, NGOs and affected residents in some projects report 
Chinese banks violating their own principles. In most overseas activities, the 
Chinese financiers are not involved in risk control after social backlash. According 
to an interview with an NDRC official, economic losses in overseas economic 
activities, including trade, investment, and build–operate–transfer (BOT), are 
expected to be taken by companies and guarantors. While the banks occasionally 
undertake joint responsibilities, the banks technically take on limited risk due to the 
mortgage of the loan. The only circumstance where the bank needs to take 
responsibility is when the bank evaluation of the project contains major flaw. 
However, two factors might incentivize the banks to actively manage risk: First, the 
mortgage often cannot be turned into monetary assets and second, local groups 
involved in the accident might appeal to Chinese banks for their intervention.  
The following section uses a few cases to compare Chinese risk 
management with the benchmark cases of JBIC. In the Japanese cases, the policy 
banks are still restrained by OECD standards to some extent, and the home 
country is occasionally appealed by affected residents to suspend the project. This 
                                                   
20 This is mentioned during an interview with a high ranking CHEXIM official. More general 
guidelines can be found at the official annual reports, however, the attempt of graudually “mixing” 
European environmental standard is not often see 
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is especially important in the Koto Panjang case as the dam is funded by ODA. In 
the Chinese cases, the government is not bound by OECD commitments and 
seldom interact with local groups. As can be shown below, the Chinese projects 
can still be suspended by stakeholders in the host country. 
2.5.1 Merowe Dam 
Merowe multipurpose project is a completed dam located on the Nile river 
and near Merowe Town, Sudan. It shares similarities with Japan’s San Roque 
dams in that it was reported to violate Sudan’s environmental regulations due to 
lack of proper EIA (Abbas, 2012). Also, the relatively large dam affected a wide 
area and the local resistance was relatively organized and successfully drew the 
attention of international human rights groups. On the other hand, the case also 
shares a few features with Koto Panjang in that the Sudanese government 
employed coercion and rejected local appeals while the Chinese government did 
not influence local disputes. The outcome is also similar with Koto Panjang, as the 
Sudanese government controlled the bargain among stakeholders and prevented 
protesters from stopping the project finance. 
The Merowe Dam project was proposed by the host government. The plan 
to build a dam on the 4th cataract of the Nile River was repeatedly proposed by 
Egypt and Sudan due to the dam’s expected utility to improve arable land, control 
flooding, and produce electricity. While the Sudanese government conducted 
multiple feasibility studies during the 1970s and 1980s, the country struggled to 
find sufficient funding. Sudan’s situation improved when oil trade expanded its 
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national economy in the late 1990s. As a major economic partner with Sudan, 
China gradually became involved in Sudanese infrastructure projects. In 2003, the 
contact to build Merowe dam was signed by Chinese and European companies. 
The dam was constructed between 2005 to 2009 and became operational in 2010.  
Similar to San Roque, Merowe Dam caused organized local resistance. The 
project forced more than 50,000 people to be resettled, and caused various new 
issues, from the accelerated Nile River evaporation (Mojon, 2007) to the 
destruction of Nubian archaeological sites. The dam was located in northern 
Sudan and was affected by the independence of South Sudan, the victims of 
Darfur and Merowe Dam sometimes vocally support each other (Radio Dabanga, 
2019). In addition to domestic resistance, the dam became an internationally 
controversial issue when a UN human rights official, Miloon Kothari, called for 
suspension of the construction of both Kajbar21 and Merowe dam in August 2007 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2007). Kothari also urged countries participating in the 
finance and construction of mentioned dams not to violate the human rights of local 
people. However, the Sudan government still completed the project despite lasting 
protests. 
The project involves various countries, including those from Europe and 
Arabia. While Sudan and China’s economic cooperation originated during the Cold 
War period, international companies and banks were also attracted to Sudan in 
the 1990s as its creditworthiness increased through oil exports. The project was 
                                                   
21 Not included in the case study because of an unspecified financier. 
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financed by a variety of financial institutions and sovereign states, including the 
Sudanese government itself (1.1 billion USD), with CHEXIM providing the largest 
loan (608 million USD).22 The construction team consisted of Chinese, German 
and French companies. As a result of multilateral cooperation led by the Sudanese 
government, while China is involved in both finance and construction of the dam, 
neither the Chinese government nor investors have major influence over the 
project.  
The Chinese government, bank, and companies stress the benefit of the 
project, especially the great power generation capacity of Merowe Dam. The 
regulator of Chinese state-owned enterprises, State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Committee (SASAC), forwarded a Sinohydro report that claims 
that “Its [Merowe Dam’s] operation will rid Sudan of the partially-functional, oil-
extensive, heavily polluting power supply and make the grid-less Sudan a country 
with modernized national grid” (Sinohydro, 2008). Meanwhile, China has made 
efforts to mitigate tensions between investors and local communities. China voted 
in favor of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and provided 
guidelines for companies, and the Chinese ambassador to Sudan promised to 
“look into the matter” (Shih, 2007). However, NGOs sometimes find that Chinese 
companies violated guidelines by constructing without consensus (Bosshard, 
2011). During the construction of nearby Kajbar dam, Sinohydro argued that “as a 
                                                   
22 Funding sources are listed on the official Merowe website. For reference, see 
http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding.html 
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contractor, it cannot influence the human rights impacts of a project and is not 
responsible for them” (Bosshard, 2011). 
The Sudanese government remained a firm supporter of the Merowe project 
(Khartoum, 2013) and used force to ensure the completion of the dam 
construction. The coercive methods contributed to the Sudanese government’s 
record of human rights violations, and several construction companies were 
punished by western countries for their involvement in the Merowe Dam project 
(Bosshard, 2011). On the other hand, the Chinese (and Arabian) financiers took 
little financial risk both in western countries and in the project and was not 
considered to be the major actor responsible for the negative impacts of the 
Merowe project. In fact, International River, one of the environmental NGOs 
opposing dam building, acknowledged the effort of the Chinese to mitigate the risk. 
As addressed by policy director Peter Bosshard, “Since 2003, China Exim Bank 
and Sinohydro have improved their environmental performance. China Exim Bank 
adopted an environmental policy in 2004 and a more detailed environmental 
guideline in 2007," "I am confident that today, China Exim Bank would not fund a 
project like the Merowe Dam again” (Shih, 2007).  
Merowe is a case where the recipient government proposed a project, led 
the project, and firmly supported the investor. The home country (China) did not 
play a major role, and was only one of the many investors led by host government. 
The authoritarianism of the Sudanese government turned out to be a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, it incited fierce local resistance and international 
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pressures; on the other hand, it used coercive means to implement the project, 
completing it despite local resistance. This case show that the host government 
remained the most powerful actor even in a controversial project that brought 
international attention, and that home government is less involved in multilateral 
projects (similar to the San Roque case). 
2.5.2 West Seti Dam 
West Seti Dam is a proposed project in northwestern Nepal that was 
cancelled due to the investors quitting. The project was proposed on the upstream 
Seti river in the Far-Western Development Region of Nepal, an area that was 
extremely undeveloped, vulnerable to earthquakes, and extremely biodiverse. The 
project was cancelled because of its failure to attract sufficient investment as well 
as the loss of important financiers, despite the expected political interest this 
cooperation will bring to Nepal and China. In this case, the Nepalese government 
is fragmented and pursues both business opportunities and environmental 
protections. The residents successfully prevented the project by raising 
resettlement and rehabilitation costs, while the investor acted like for-profit private 
financiers and had little bargaining power to lift the tight regulations. This is a case 
where both governments intend to promote an economically questionable project 
(statecraft), but the risks outweigh non-market benefits from the perspective of the 
investor.  
The project had been proposed several times by the host government. From 
1994 to 2011, the dam was first to be managed by Snowy Mountain Engineering 
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Corporation (SMEC), an Australian company that provided consultative services 
to infrastructure (Uprety, 2011) and CHEXIM and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
agreed to finance the project. However, in 2010, ADB was forced to quit after an 
activist network, Water and Energy Users' Federation-Nepal (WAFED), launched 
a campaign and accused ADB of violating its own environmental and resettlement 
policies (Tanabe, 2007) (International River, 2011). China National Machinery 
Import and Export Corporation (CMC), the company that agreed to provide the 
machinery to SMEC, also quitted in 2010 for unspecified reason. After losing both 
financiers and facilities providers, SMEC lost its license in July 2011. 
Nepal has maintained a positive attitude toward Chinese economic 
involvement to counter the influence of India. China Three Gorges Corporation 
(CTGC) expressed its interest in August 2011 and was offered a public-private 
partnership proposal in December (Hydro World, 2011). The Nepalese 
government showed its interest by forming coordination agencies such as 
Investment Board Nepal (IBN) and Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) Coordination 
Committee. A subsidiary company of CTGC (CWE Investment) signed an MoU 
with the Nepalese government in 2012; however, CTGC made little progress due 
to high expected costs of resettlement, rehabilitation, dam maintenance and power 
transmission. After the 2015 earthquake, Nepal intended to facilitate the 
negotiations in the hopes of boosting the damaged economy, but the risk of 
another earthquake in the mountainous far-west Nepal further increased the 
expected cost (Bhushal, 2016).  
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Despite Nepal’s compromises such as reducing proposed dam capacity 
and extending electricity purchase agreements, CTGC eventually expressed its 
intention to withdraw in 2018 (Ghimire, 2018). The company’s spokesperson cited 
“the project's low rate of return and said it would respect the decision of the next 
board meeting of the Investment Board of Nepal (IBN)” (AsianPower, 2018), 
whereas IBN denied governmental intention to halt the project, claiming that CTGC 
made the decision (EKantipur.com, 2018). The spokesperson of the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also claimed that “the relevant project is a commercial 
one. The Chinese firm involved is in talks with the Nepali side on this project's 
economic feasibility and other matters” (EKantipur.com, 2018). The evidence 
suggests that the withdraw of CTGC is a commercial decision, especially 
considering that the Sino-Nepal relationship in 2018 did not experience major 
setbacks that might lead to China’s punishing policy. 
West Seti Dam is a project with inherently high costs, which are 
exacerbated by influential activists and strictly implemented environmental 
regulations. When the Chinese bank and company replaced the previous investors 
and contractors, the environmental risk was already high enough to dissuade 
construction. While the Nepalese government intended to pursue profit at various 
points, it was unable to reduce the rehabilitation cost or to persuade the activists. 
At the end of CTGC involvement, the Chinese government explicitly considered 
the project to be commercial and showed no attempt to intervene. 
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2.5.3 Myitsone Dam 
The Myitsone Dam in northern Myanmar is one of the most controversial 
Chinese overseas investments to date, and the most prominent example of 
“troubled” investment from China. The dam was proposed at the confluence of the 
Mali and N’mai rivers and the source of another river but was never completed. 
With a massive flooding area, the project was expected to have major 
environmental and social impacts. China Development Bank and CHEXIM 
(International River, 2012) were the financiers. 
Similar to most of the cases above, the host government proposed the dam 
long before the involvement of Chinese or Japanese investors. The idea of utilizing 
hydroelectric potential in the region can be traced back to the 1950s, and the first 
feasibility study was conducted in 1979 (Huang, 2016). Myitsone Dam was formally 
proposed in 2001 as a part of Confluence Region Hydropower Project (CRHP) by 
Myanmar Electrical Power Enterprise and the Agriculture and Irrigation Ministry. 
This project involves over 60 hydroelectric power stations and is a long-term 
economic strategy designed by the Myanmar military government. The Myanmar 
government originally hired the Japanese company KEPCO to design Myitsone 
dam in 2002, but KEPCO later declined the offer for two reasons – opposition from 
the minority military and the excessive power capacity that could not be consumed 
by Myanmar or transmitted to China.  
China’s involvement started in 2003, when Myanmar and Chinese 
companies jointly surveyed the area. The project was then planned by Chinese 
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companies and the host government - there is no evidence of involvement of the 
Chinese government. 23  In October 2006, Myanmar invited China Power 
Investment Corporation (CPI) to manage the project during the China-ASEAN 
Exposition. The Ministry of Electric Power No. 1 and CPI  signed the MoU of 
Myitsone in December and the next year, several engineering groups including 
Changjiang Design Institute of China began the design of the Myitsone project. In 
March 2009, the Chinese and Myanmar governments signed a framework 
agreement and in June 2009, the memorandum of agreement was signed by the 
Department of Hydropower Implementation and CPI. The cost was estimated to 
be 3.6 billion USD, which was to be co-financed by both countries. The Myanmar 
financiers included the Ministry of Electric Power No. 1 and the Asia World 
Company, while the Chinese financiers vary among sources, but include CPI, 
China Development Bank, Gezhouba Crop and Sinohydro. Myitsone construction 
began in 2009 but was suspended two years later.  
The project was stopped after a regime change, which showed that the host 
country ultimately controlled the implementation of the project. On September 30, 
2011, at the beginning of Myanmar’s democratic reform, Myanmar President Thein 
Sein announced the suspension of Myitsone Dam. Villagers evicted during the 
construction returned to villages in 2012. There were occasional accusations of 
the Myanmar government secretly restarting the project (such as Hindstrom, 
                                                   
23 This is based on a series of online searches using news report archives such as Nexis Uni. In 
fact there has been no report mentioning Chinese government before 2007. 
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2012), but no further progress on dam construction was confirmed. CPI took full 
responsibility for the risk, and the loans from policy banks were paid using 
mortgages. The financiers were not held responsible for the loss by the Chinese 
government. 
The negative social impacts, as well as nationalism incited by the presumed 
“resource grabbing,” led to organized local resistance and an alliance between 
locals and the new administration. First, over 11,000 people from 47 villages would 
need to be relocated by the project, and 447 square kilometers of land, mostly 
controlled by Kechin Independence Organization (KIO) would be flooded. KIO was 
the de facto governing entity of Kechin state and since 2004 had been in conflict 
with Than Shwe regime. In 2007, 12 Kechin leaders sent a letter to Senior General 
Than Shwe and Ministry of Electric Power, demanding the dam to be stopped 
(International River, 2012). Aside from political bargaining, Kechin nationalism also 
contributed to local opposition. Activists claimed that the region was the “sacred 
mountain” of the Kechin nation, and the construction would destroy historical sites 
of Christian, Buddhist and local religion worshippers (Naing, 2008). The dam was 
also considered to be a symbol of China’s resource grabbing. 90% of the 
generated powers would be exported to China, which would generate withholding 
tax and export tax for the military government (Lwin & Kyaw, 2011). NGOs also 
accused CPI of illegally prospecting golds and publishing social responsibility 
reports solely written by Chinese investigators (Fan, 2015). The Thein Sein 
government chose to address the popular opinion against the dam, “to solve the 
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worries of the people” (Harvey, 2011). Faced with a local resistance-host 
government alliance, the investor had very limited bargaining power to revive the 
project. 
The Chinese company and media made several counter-arguments. Some 
media outlets questioned the cultural importance of Myitsone, suggesting that the 
cultural meaning of “sacred mountain” was an exaggerated concept to incite 
nationalism among Kechin people, whose national beliefs have been largely 
replaced by Christian ones (Huang, 2016) (Qin, 2012). As for the electricity 
distribution, CPI claimed that its electricity will “prioritize Myanmar market” and by 
“possibly supplying 100% electricity to Myanmar if the market grows large enough” 
(People's Daily, 2014). The Chinese company also accused NGOs of using 
uncertified claims on social media (Fan, 2015). The progress of Myitsone dam in 
Ang San So Kii’s term is unreported and varies according to different interviewees; 
however, it is still widely agreed that Myitsone project is unlikely to be revived in 
the foreseeable future, and that it remains as one of the most sensitive issues in 
Myanmar.  
Combining two sides of the story, the main reason for strong local 
opposition was the exclusion of residents from the negotiation between Myanmar 
military government and Chinese contractors. According to a Chinese field 
researcher, the residents were neutral on environmental change, but they opposed 
government projects implemented without the consensus of Kechin people (Qin, 
2012). The dispute surrounding “sacred mountain” and exploitative electricity 
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exports might have been exaggerated, but they were important mainly as the 
catalyst of Kechin nationalism (Kiik, 2016). In addition, the changing policy of the 
Myanmar government is an important factor in the suspension of Myitsone. 
Opposition of the dam existed long before Thein Sein came into power, and the 
project was started despite continuous resistance from Kechin people. The 
Myanmar government swayed its alliance from China to local communities, 
causing a sharp turn on the progress of Myitsone. 
2.6 Recap of Findings 
 This study selected five cases with significant and negative environmental 
and social impacts to study “risky” investments. All five cases are hydroelectric 
projects because dams are  likely to incur protests due to environmental impacts 
and the need to resettle residents. The following table summarizes the 
characteristics of the five cases. 
TABLE 2.1 DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH CASE 
 Koto Panjang San Roque Merowe West Seti Myitsone 
Finance suspended?  Y  Y Y 
Host government 
supporting local appeal?  Y  Y Y 
Organized resistance?  Y Y Y Y 
ODA by OECD standard? Y     
Home country’s court 
involved? Y     
Home country uses 
diplomacy?     Y 
Host country’s regime 
change?  Y   Y 
High environmental cost?    Y  
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In the case of the Merowe and Koto Panjang dams, the host government 
chose to ignore the opposition from local communities, resulting in the successful 
completion of the projects. In other cases, the local resistance was strong enough 
to persuade the government to tighten regulations or to suspend the project to 
protect local interests. The West Seti Dam is a unique case in which the local 
resistance strengthened environmental regulations to the point where the project 
was no longer profitable. The Chinese company (and its public financier) did not 
clash with local resistance because it was a latecomer to replace a withdrawn 
Australian company and it failed to influence the existing environmental regulations 
and eventually had to quit. San Roque and Myitsone are cases in which the host 
government switched sides after a leadership change. In the Myitsone case, the 
Chinese government actually made a diplomatic effort to protect the interests of 
Chinese companies. However, its influence on Myanmar domestic politics was too 
limited to save the project after public backlash. 
A few similarities are shown among the cases. First, the investor 
governments are usually not directly involved in the project because they treat the 
projects as business. The Japanese government clearly stated its unwillingness to 
intervene in local disputes in the case of Koto Panjang. The Chinese government 
is not deeply involved in Merowe and West Seti Dam and considered the projects 
as commercial, non-political deals. The only contradicting case is Myistone, where 
the Chinese government communicated with Myanmar upon project suspension 
and took the financial loss for CDB. However, even in the dispute of Myitsone, the 
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Chinese government could only influence Myanmar decision makers via limited 
diplomatic channels, and it failed to alter Myanmar policy and to revive the project. 
A second similarity is that the projects are mostly planned by the host 
government, and the policy banks and company contractors are driven by profit. 
Many of the cases were proposed and studied before the involvement of policy 
banks, such as West Seti Dam and Myitsone Dam. In addition, contrary to the 
state-led pattern of investment, there is limited evidence of investor-host 
governmental arrangement before the investment. Moreover, the resistance 
against projects is mostly directed toward the host government, instead of toward 
the investor. Statecraft theorists might argue that the home countries shape 
projects by limiting choices of host countries. For example, data on China’s recent 
energy investments show that Chinese construction of power plants are 
concentrated in hydroelectric and coal-fire sectors,24 which leaves limited choices 
to China’s economic partners that plan to construct new power plants. However, 
as the Chinese cases show, the host governments of highly disputed projects 
usually proposed the project based on the host’s natural endowment, sought 
contractors from more than one country, and were driven by its economic gain 
instead of limited choices. 
A third similarity, as the projects are treated as “commercial” and mainly 
determined by the host country, public capital is neither better nor worse than 
private capital. The major determining factor in mitigating social and environmental 
                                                   
24 Data from China’s Global Energy Finance database by Boston University. 
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risks is still the host government. The social responsibility commitment of a 
company or country can prompt the company to be responsible (as in the San 
Roque and Merowe case) or be used by resistance to pressure the company (as 
in the Koto Panjang case). However, aside from the Koto Panjang case, which is 
an ODA, there is no direct connection between investor’s social responsibility and 
state ownership. Projects such as Merowe and San Roque are jointly financed by 
public and private financiers, none of which have as much influence as the host 
country. 
A fourth similarity, due to the R-G-I triangular bargaining structure and the 
limited involvement of the investor government, the policy banks enjoy a relatively 
high degree of autonomy in their participation of overseas projects. This indicates 
that the overseas regulation of state-owned financiers can be inefficient. The case 
studies do not deny the state’s capability to positively task its agents to carry out 
statecraft. However, the five cases indicate that, as the home government cannot 
control every contract of its public financiers, it cannot efficiently prevent agents 
from participating in “risky” projects that negative impact on national image. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 It is often perceived that, due to the financial endorsement from 
government, policy banks can engage in projects whose risks discourage private 
capital. Quantitative studies on Chinese and Japanese policy banks also indicate 
that they tend to invest in countries with negative economic prospects and high 
political instability. This raises the question as to what exactly makes policy banks 
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invest in risky projects. 
This study uses cases of risky investments by Chinese and Japanese policy 
banks to illustrate how some of the world’s largest public financiers respond to 
social and environmental risks. The question is raised because of the common 
assumption that the state can order its public financiers to invest in risky projects 
for political gains. The Chinese and Japanese policy banks are among the world’s 
largest infrastructure investors, and they sometimes face the opposition of local 
residents. This study selects five cases from the Environmental Justice Atlas 
database, all of which reached “medium” levels of violence. The details of cases, 
which include completed and suspended projects, indicate that these risky projects 
are less likely to be driven by the strategic decisions of Chinese and Japanese 
governments. Instead, the projects are mainly proposed by the host government, 
and the Chinese and Japanese policy banks participate in the project to pursue 
profit. 
 The study proposes an analytical framework based on the theories of 
interest groups. For the sake of simplicity, the study categorizes important 
stakeholders into four groups. The investor government (F) is an external actor 
that can only influence the project indirectly, while other actors, including local 
resistance (R), host government (G) and investor companies and banks (I) formed 
a R-G-I triangular model of bargaining. G is often the party to propose a project, 
attract public and private investors, and balance between the economic profit (I) 
and local loss (R). G ultimately determines the fate of a project. 
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 It is worth noting that this study does not deny the existence of state-driven 
investment by Chinese and Japanese governments, and there are plentiful cases 
of state-promoted economic cooperation during Japan’s economic regionalization 
in Southeast Asia and China’s current effort of the Belt and Road Initiative. The 
study does not deny the effort of the investor state to improve local livelihoods and 
to mitigate risk. The study does point out that, in the cases of “dangerous” projects 
that are likely to have negative social and environmental impacts, it is less likely 
that the investor state — even those with massive banks as state agents — 
intentionally ignore risk to facilitate their strategic goals. Also, the study suggests 
that the host government should play a more responsible role in handling projects 
with inherent risk. 
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Chapter 3 Banking by Government: Comparative Study of Government-
Policy Bank Relationships in China and Japan 
3.1 Introduction 
 China has the world’s largest state-owned financial institutions, or “policy 
banks”, including China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import Bank 
(CHEXIM). The only comparable economy in terms of policy bank usage is Japan, 
of which the major policy bank is Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). 
In their overseas operation, policy banks are tasked with governmental goals while 
still allowed to pursue profit. These observations lead to important questions for 
policy makers and researchers: What is the regulatory framework of outbound 
public finance? To what extent are they effective? How can they hold policy lending 
to be responsive and accountable?   
This study compares Chinese and Japanese bank regulation, and finds a 
number of key points: (1) The policy banks in China and Japan retain high levels 
of autonomy; (2) inefficient regulatory structures contribute to the autonomy of 
banks; and (3) the problem of “fragmented principal” is the major cause of 
inefficient regulation. Based on interviews with diverse stakeholders and frontline 
experts and supported by various archival evidence, this study concludes that 
Japan features ministry-bank ties while China has umbrella-shaped joint 
regulations. Both can result in fragmented regulations, and Japanese policy banks 
enjoy autonomy due to the lack of inter-ministerial coordination, whereas Chinese 
policy banks have autonomy as a result of NDRC, the main regulator, being 
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inherently fragmented. However, the Chinese structure can be occasionally more 
efficient when the chief regulator and major banks jointly promote the policy.   
Due to a series of structural reforms, Japan’s regulatory structure focuses 
heavily on paired bank-ministry relations and lacks inter-ministerial coordination. 
On the other hand, due to its history of planning economy, China has one powerful 
super-ministry, which has many bureaus with diverse interests. In addition, CDB 
has much broader responsibilities compared to Japanese banks and can even 
promote industrial policies, which makes it a more efficient agent once it reaches 
agreement with fragmented principals. As a result, the Japanese regulatory 
structure is largely vertical due to equally powerful ministries possessing their own 
agents and lacking coordination, whereas the Chinese regulatory structure 
enables more coordinated regulation because of the authority of NDRC. When 
NDRC itself is ambiguous on policy due to conflicting interests within itself, China’s 
state control is not effective as NDRC cannot lead other ministries. The state 
agents, especially CDB, enjoy autonomy because of fragmented regulation. When 
NDRC and CDB coordinates with each other to actively promote a policy, however, 
the Chinese model becomes more efficient. 
3.2 Literature Review 
 This study focuses on the ineffectiveness of state agent regulation in state-
led development. The literature has suggested that successful late-developing 
countries strategically support certain industries or companies in the country and 
achieve national goals (Gerschenkron, 1962). Developmental state theories, which 
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are heavily based on the “state capitalist” cases of East and Southeast Asian 
economies, argue that the state is an independent rational planner (Johnson, 
1982) that uses various economic tools to create business opportunity (Hatch & 
Yamamura, 1996), seek resources (Ge, 2014) and increase the competitiveness 
of export sectors (Solis, 2004). Statecraft theorists adds that the state can 
strategically guide economic activities to facilitate its policy goals - its tools range 
from punishing other countries (Hirschman, 1945) (Pape, 1997) (Fuchs & Klann, 
2013) to economic diplomacy (Norris, 2016) (Li & Sun, 2014) (Piccone, 2016). 
These theories provide theoretical justification to the usage of state agents such 
as policy banks. 
However, other theories argue that the state cannot effectively implement 
its own policies. The criticism consists of two arguments, which are explored in 
greater detail below: first, policies only reflect the interests of special interest 
groups; and second, the state agents have their own interests and might not 
implement state strategy as expected. 
3.2.1 Distorted Policy 
Some literature suggests that economic policy might not reflect national 
interest, but, rather, that of interest groups. They argue that governments always 
makes compromises among the interests of specific groups (Schmitter, 1974), that 
policies are the result of political bargaining between political elites and social 
groups (Evans, 1995), and that domestic politics is a “black box” system of 
demanding and supporting groups (Easton, 1953). Overseas economic policies 
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affect international trade and investment, which generates domestic winners and 
losers (Frieden, 1991) that support current policy, demand a change and use 
various resources to “acquire control over others” or “gain autonomy” (Dahl, 1978). 
The interest groups can be ministries, companies, non-governmental associations 
and they can also form temporary social alliances (Gourevitch, 1986) (Rogowski, 
1989) based on common agendas (Polsby, 1980). 
Elite pluralism considers some elite groups to be more influential than 
others (Manley, 1983) (Schattschneider, 1960) and able to create public policy that 
is biased toward their interests (Schattschneider, 1933). These can lead to biased 
policies favoring a specific group over others. While the loser of such a policy might 
outnumber the winner (such as consumer vs producer in protectionism), the 
problem of collective action (Alt & Gilligan, 1992) and imperfect information 
(Lasswell, 1951) prevents political bargaining to be a “fair game.” Studies on Japan 
suggest that powerful interest groups may form a circle of repeated negotiations, 
setting up policies to compensate short-term loss and externalize risk to outsiders 
(Calder, 2017).  
Corporatist theories often suggest that industrial groups are capable of 
bargaining with the state to shape policies. Empirical case studies on Japanese 
overseas economic policy find that domestic producer groups affect which sector 
governmental subsidies go to, even if subsidizing said sector is inefficient (Solis, 
2004). Some models argue that Chinese policy making is also affected by 
corporatism (Unger & Chan, 1995) (Weil, 2017), but other researchers suggest 
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that China’s state capitalist model is different from a corporatist model (Gilley, 
2011). In late developing economies such as China, the governments possess 
state-owned enterprises that bear non-market goals (such as maintaining the 
employment rate) and occupies various key sectors (such as infrastructure and 
energy) - the “state acts as the dominant economic player and uses markets 
primarily for political gain” (Bremmer, 2010). However, these theories do not cover 
the innate structure of the government as a group of actors, which is discussed 
below. 
3.2.2 Ineffective Regulation 
The second argument is that the state suffers from “agent slack” – situations 
where agents use asymmetric expertise (Hart & Holmström, 1987), prioritize their 
own interests over those of regulators, externalize risks to regulators (Krugman, 
2009), and cause moral hazards (Cyert & March, 1963)  (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This forces principals to make “positive” arrangements to incentivize the 
agents (Prendergast, 1999) and “negative” regulations to hold agents accountable 
(Gailmard, 2014).  
China is especially characterized for its “fragmented authoritarianism” 
(Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992), which implies a 
decentralized distribution of power among “horizontal” principals (regulators) and 
“vertical” agents and local government. This is a unique characteristic of Chinese 
bureaucracy derived from the practice of post-Mao era reform and the nature of 
China’s single-party political system. Some studies pointed out that the conflicting 
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interests among regulator groups (Barnett, 1967) (Unger & Chan, 1995) hinders 
regulation, resulting in unrestrained overseas expansion that might hurt the 
national image (Brautigam, 2009). Some studies address the innate 
ineffectiveness of direct enterprise-level intervention (Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007), 
instructive policies (Breslin, 1996) and state-supported agents (such as Ye, 2017).  
However, other theories argue that the cadre system of the Chinese 
communist party allows the Chinese government to maintain centralized authority 
via personnel appointments and financial approvals (Edin, 2003) (Naughton & 
Yang, 2004). Recent studies also indicate that the Chinese government also uses 
“strategic goals” to mobilize fragmented agencies (Ye, 2019). In terms of overseas 
bank regulation, there is no clear conclusion on the effectiveness of a fragmented 
authoritarian regulatory system. This study  analyzes these issues using existing 
theories and empirical evidence. 
The regulatory inefficiency is not China-exclusive. The problem of the 
“common agency, multiple principals” problem (Voorn, Van Genugten, & Van Thiel, 
2019) exists in organization theory, arguing that the principals might act according 
to their own interests instead of joint interests (Bernheim & Whinston, 1986). 
Common agency theories point out multiple reasons for inefficient regulation in the 
public sector: exacerbated asymmetrical information, an active agent aligning itself 
with some principals via bribing, or principals duplicating or free-riding on other 
principals. The existence of coordination among principals depends on the 
bargaining among the principals (Dixit, Grossman, & Helpman, 1997). Some of 
   82 
these arguments can be verified in the following case of Japan and China. 
However, the majority of common agency literature are presented in models - this 
study uses empirical evidence to address the common agency problem of both 
Japan and China. 
3.3 Research Design 
 Two previous studies compared Chinese and Japanese policy banks using 
energy loans data (not counting foreign aid defined by the OECD) from China and 
Japan from 2006 to 2015, archives and interviews. These preceding studies 
discovered a few similarities among Chinese and Japanese policy banks: (1) They 
granted more loans to recipient with currently good economy, which is like private 
capital, but also grant more loans to recipient with negative economic prospect, 
which is a unique characteristic of public capital; (2) policy banks of both countries 
tended to invest in countries with higher economic and political instability; and (3) 
upon inspecting five typical projects that caused violence and dispute, the 
preceding study found that these “risky” investment were more profit-driven 
operations than intentional political assignment, and that political banks were 
largely autonomous in overseas operation.  
However, some questions remain. To what extent can state agents be 
reined in to enforce state mandates? If the regulation is ineffective, what 
characteristics of regulatory structure is responsible for such failure? This study 
analyzes how regulatory and decision-making structure between policy banks and 
their respective governments affect policy implementation. Using qualitative 
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evidences from archives and interviews, this study argues that the fragmented 
nature of state principals (regulators) is the main cause of regulatory inefficiency 
in both countries. 
Research in this article heavily draws upon selected elite surveys, with 
extensive analysis of available archives and official documents, as well as 
scholarly publications when they are available. In the surveys component, the 
focus is on about 15 scholars, bank officials and governmental officials in each 
country. The scholarly experts are mostly selected for their first-hand experience 
in one of the following fields: bank regulation, policy formation or overseas 
investment. Other experts, especially those with NGO or academic backgrounds, 
are selected as they are long-term observers of Chinese or Japanese overseas 
finance with first hand empirical studies and are selected not only to compensate 
the availability of officials, but also to prevent biases. 
Interviewees are given one of the three sets of semi-structured questions, 
depending on their position as a scholar, governmental or bank official. These 
questions start with a basic introduction about the regulatory structure and policy, 
then proceed to specific responsibilities of the ministry, coordination, stances on 
specific issues, and conflicts among ministries. The last group of questions 
involves typical cases of overseas finance, such as the Myitsone Dam project and 
China’s photovoltaic exports. The actual questions vary according to the flow of 
the interview but follow the same guidelines and structure.  
The potential interviewees were contacted via multiple channels, including 
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personal email, third-party recommendations and social networks, and while more 
than 30 candidates in both countries (aside from about 10 in the U.S.) were 
contacted, only a fraction agreed for an interview. The availability and willingness 
of experts, especially experts that currently hold a governmental or bank position, 
was restrained, as interviewees from both countries have repeatedly implied that 
details about specific projects are considered to be commercial secrets and cannot 
be shared. The sensitivity of topics is circumvented in a few ways, including 
hypothetical questions, citing publicly available materials and referring to other 
stakeholders. To protect the privacy of interviewees, especially the current bank 
and governmental officials, none of their positions are mentioned in the study, and 
direct quotations are avoided. The study has not conducted repeated interviews, 
but occasionally used follow up emails to clarify information. 
In addition to these interviews, dozens of informal, off-the-record interviews 
and discussions have been conducted with other researchers and scholars. These 
experts are mainly from the U.S., China and Japan, although several financial 
experts from other countries contribute to the research design. Their fields of 
expertise range from governmental approval procedure and inter-ministerial 
relationships to specific overseas investment projects. Also, this includes several 
entrepreneurs that were unavailable during the field study, who generously offered 
brief off-the-record discussions. These informal interviews were conducted to 
gather supporting evidence, to compensate for the lack of enterprise stakeholders 
in formal interviews, and more importantly, to contact important interviewees in 
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Japan and China. For example, the Japanese banks can only be approached via 
the recommendation of bank officials — “senior” individuals with personal 
connections and well-connected local scholars. Although not on record, these 
informal interviews have led to rare interview opportunities with frontline bank 
officials. 
3.4 Different Structures of Bank Regulations 
 China and Japan have different agencies that are qualified as policy banks. 
While both Chinese and Japanese banks are regulated by the central government 
in theory, the structure of regulators are different in various ways. They both suffer 
from the problem of “fragmented principals”, but the patterns of fragmentation 
differ. 
This study uses the word “fragmented principals” instead of common 
agency for various reasons. First, both China and Japan have one entity that is 
theoretically owned or regulated by one authority — the central government. 
Second, the principals are different ministries of the government, which is a unique 
case of “multiple principals, common agency”; compared to commercial principals, 
their role as regulators is more important. The coordination among regulators — 
the regulatory structure of government — is the key of efficient regulation, is 
theoretically present, and is often absent in practice. The following figure is a 
summary based on interview findings, statements on different websites and 
ministerial presence in important documents. This study argues that the regulatory 
structure is related to the division of responsibilities among policy banks; the 
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ambiguous but wide responsibility of CDB is related to China’s umbrella-shaped 
regulation.  
FIGURE 3.1 REGULATORY STRUCTURE IN CHINA AND JAPAN 
 
3.4.1 Policy Bank Setup in China 
The three policy banks25 are all self-defined as “policy-oriented financial 
institutions” (政策性金融机构) that are “under direct leadership of State Council of 
China” (国务院直接领导)26. Differing from Japanese policy banks, the Chinese 
banks stress the state’s role as strategic instructors instead of shareholders, so 
the banks are defined more like governmental agencies instead of financially 
independent, for-profit companies. 
Some of these banks have unique responsibilities. For example, CHEXIM 
                                                   
25 China Development Bank, China Export-Import Bank and Agricultural Development Bank of 
China. 
26 This term is used in the “History” section of both official bank websites of CDB and CHEXIM. 
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is specifically tasked for assisting the exports of machinery equipment, re-lending 
foreign loans and issuing “two preferential” loans.27 However, the responsibility of 
CDB is not clearly defined, as the bank is described ambiguously to operate for 
“financial business such as mid-long-term loans and investments” (China 
Development Bank, 2016). Together with the massive size of CDB compared to 
other policy banks, the ambiguous responsibility makes CDB the most important 
policy bank in China. 
Unlike national development banks in many countries, CDB actively 
participates in overseas investment and trade and is often involved in major deals 
ranging from 30-year loans to Rosneft and Transneft (Russian gas procurement) 
to annual loans to Petrobras (sometimes tied with Brazilian oil procurement).  In 
terms of development finance, its overseas responsibility often overlaps with the 
newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Due to the AIIB 
having smaller assets and higher standards, CDB still functions as the major 
development finance provider for most China-related projects. In addition to loans, 
CDB is also pivotal in the implementation of Chinese monetary and fiscal policies  
(People.com, 2008), thus becoming both an important assistant and subordinate 
of both People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and National Development and Reform 
Committee (NDRC). 
                                                   
27 The word “two preferential loans” (两优贷款) is a term used by Chinese media. This includes 
concessional loans (优惠贷款) and preferential export buyer’s credit (优惠出口买方信贷). The 
main difference between them is that PEBC is lent in USD while a concessional loan is lent in 
RMB. They have a grace period, long repayment period and interest rates that are low compared 
to non-concessional loans but still much higher than ODA interest rates. 
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All Chinese policy banks were established in 1994 as parts of China’s 
financial reform. Chinese policy banks were created by integrating investment 
corporations for various reasons that can be expected from late-development 
theory: China was in shortage of capital and intended to concentrate financial 
support to several “key sectors”. CHEXIM experienced one major rearrangement 
in 2001 that separated the export insurance section into the state-owned insurance 
company Sinosure28; however, its responsibility as an export credit agency did not 
change. On the other hand, the responsibility of CDB did change over time. Upon 
its establishment, CDB was designed to “guide social capital to focus on the 
development of bottleneck sectors that hinders national economic development” 
(State Council of PRC, 1994). In practice, the principle means that CDB operations 
are often similar to the “private capital” it guides. 
CDB was granted a specific right to issue “soft loans” – lending its registered 
capital to state-owned companies and local governments as long-term, low-
interest loans. This was favored by Chinese clients in the early 2000s, resulting in 
the rapid expansion of CDB compared to other banks, as well as the debate over 
whether CDB should compete with commercial banks (Nie, 2012). The debate 
ended when CDB became a limited liability corporation in 2008, but the shares are 
still held by four state-owned entities.29 CHEXIM remains a state-owned financial 
                                                   
28 The main driver of this rearrnagement is the requirement of WTO. Sinosure is an important 
cooperator of CHEXIM and CDB as it provides insurance to various  
29 These include: Ministry of Finance (36.54%), Central Huijin Investment Ltd (State Council, 
34.68%), Wutongshu Investment Platform Ltd (State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 
27.19%) and China Social Security Fund (less than 2%) 
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institution. 
In 2015, CDB was officially defined as a “development bank” (开发性银行), 
which differentiates itself from a “policy bank” such as CHEXIM. According to CDB 
officials, “policy” bank indicates a strong governmental background and heavily 
favored financial support (政府色彩、财政倾斜), whereas CDB aims at developing 
industries so that private capital can follow. In Chinese overseas practice, the 
relationship between CDB and other financial institutions is described as “lion and 
vulture.”30 As can be seen in practice, CDB leads the Chinese consortium (Chin & 
Gallagher, 2019) and picks the largest projects, then other banks move into the 
recipient country that has been deemed safe by CDB. Meanwhile, the leading 
officials of policy banks often have profound banking experiences before their term 
and continue to work in state administrations or state-owned banks31 as financial 
experts. 
3.4.2 China’s Overarching Regulatory Structure  
The Chinese policy banks are not bound to specific ministries, instead, they 
                                                   
30 A reference used in the interview of a CDB official. While rhetoric was different, the official 
website of CDB mostly confirms its leading role, see http://www.cdb.com.cn/ywgl/xdyw/gjhzyw/ 
31 For a quick example, Yao Zhenyan, the first president of CDB, served as vice director of 
National People's Congress Financial and Economic Affairs Committee of National Congress 
(China’s national legislator). Liu Liange, one of the recent presidents of CHEXIM, became the 
head of Bank of China in 2018. Li Ruogu, one of the most important CHEXIM president, no longer 
worked at an important governmental position after leaving the bank. It is also mentioned during 
the interview that policy bank officials often go to commercial banks, which value their 
development and management expertise. There is no record of a policy bank elite becoming an 
important decision maker in the Chinese political system aside from Chen Yuan.  Chen Yuan 
himself became the vice chairman of National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, which is generally considered as an honorary, consultative institution 
for retired officials.  
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are regulated by a set of ministries. The list of regulators changes in different 
regulatory documents, but it generally includes the following ones32; some of the 
minor regulators only become influential after Chen Yuan’s term: 
• NDRC: The National Development and Reform Commission is the 
successor of National Planning Economy Commission. It is one of the most 
important decision makers in China’s daily economic activities. Horizontally, 
it has specific bureaus for different industries, such as Energy Bureau for 
energy sector, etc. Vertically, local NDRCs are responsible for approving 
smaller projects within the region and regulating the operation of 
infrastructure (such as state grids), some of which are financed by CDB. 
According to the 2004 NDRC regulation on outbound FDI, the committee 
also monitors the outflow of foreign exchange; its approval (which can take 
various forms depending on the project) is necessary for any Chinese 
overseas project (NDRC, 2004).  
• China Banking Regulatory Commission: This commission offers 
instructions for the loan approval process of banks. 
• State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE): Currently a major 
shareholder of CDB and the sole provider of foreign exchange to banks, as 
per Chinese regulations. Together with MOFCOM, this agency is also 
important for collecting statistical data of overseas investment (MOFCOM, 
                                                   
32 It is important to note that the interviews took place after the term of Chen Yuan as the 
chairman of CDB, during which CDB had greater influence over some of the above ministries. 
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2019). 
• Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM): This used to be the key ministry to 
approve overseas projects but after China’s entry to the WTO, much of its 
regulatory authority was transferred to NDRC and SAFE. It is still one of the 
most important regulators as all overseas investments are required to 
register at the Department of Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation, which is supposed to be a key coordinator of the “Going Out” 
strategy (MOFCOM, 2015). However, the ministry became mostly 
consultative in the current setup of regulators, due to the power of approving 
projects and making policies held by NDRC. It influences the direction and 
targeted sector of Chinese overseas investment. MOFCOM is also capable 
of issuing grants, although grants amounts are much smaller than loans 
from policy banks. The nature of MOFCOM is promoting exports, including 
controversial ones such as coal fire power stations. Therefore, MOFCOM is 
not known as an influential veto power.  
• PBOC: PBOC is the central bank of China and the key decision maker of 
China’s monetary policies. PBOC also controls the overall amount of capital 
outflow, which changes according to the current policy of “Going Out” 
strategy.  
• Ministry of Finance (MOF): A major shareholder of CDB. MOF is overall 
influential due to its control of budgeting, taxation and national assets. It is 
especially influential for “government-supported” finance such as the “two 
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preferential” loans, as subsidies are granted directly by MOF. 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): MOFA is involved in the regulation of 
overseas economic activities. However, it is not as deeply involved as 
actors above. There is no clear evidence of statecraft being devised by 
MOFA, judging from interviews but it occasionally appears in joint policies 
instructing overseas investment. 
Overall speaking, the Chinese regulators form an umbrella-shaped joint 
regulatory structure. These ministries do not have a hierarchical order under the 
State Council, although the Chinese interviewees have a consensus that NDRC 
and MOF are more influential than other ministries in the State Council due to their 
“upstream” position in ministerial budget approval. Important policies are often 
jointly announced by various ministries, where NDRC joins frontline regulators that 
are in charge of approving or monitoring projects. For example, in Nov 28, 2016, 
a joint announcement of NDRC, SAFE, PBOC and MOFCOM were made to 
express governmental concern of overseas asset procurement during the year 
(Xinhua Agency, 2016). Illegal outflow of foreign exchange was regulated by SAFE 
but, the decision of re-examining outbound capital flow was announced by 
spokesmen from the four regulators. In August 18th, 2017, State Council circulated 
“Instructions of Further Guiding and Regulating the Directions of Overseas 
Investment” (State Council PRC, 2017), which is a guiding document from NDRC, 
MOFCOM, PBOC and MOFA. This document directly listed industries that should 
be encouraged or discouraged, serving as one of the important guidelines for loan 
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approval.  
Despite having NDRC being a powerful coordinator among ministries, the 
Chinese system suffers from fragmented regulation in multiple ways. First, the 
ministries have conflicted interest, which is shown in case studies such as China’s 
expansion in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Second, NDRC is a super-ministry with 
various bureaus and officials governing different sectors, which might lead to inner-
NDRC inconsistencies (as shown in the coal reduction case below). Third, CDB is 
often tasked with exploratory goals33, and gains autonomy in field operation. It is 
explained by an interviewee that, when CDB was tasked to stimulate economy 
during the 2008 “4 trillion RMB” fiscal expansion (Zhang, 2019), the bank was 
granted capital and told to find suitable project itself. These factors make the 
Chinese umbrella-shaped regulatory system less efficient than it seems. 
3.4.3 Policy Bank Setup in Japan 
Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) used to be a bank with wide 
responsibilities, similar to CDB but the Japanese policy banks experienced a series 
of reforms and rearrangements since its economic takeoff. Nowadays Japanese 
policy banks show clear division of authority and responsibility, thanks to the 
reforms, and are regulated by specific ministries. This leads to the vertical, paired 
regulation between ministries and their banks. Japanese policy banks are usually 
                                                   
33 Summarized from cases in an interview with a CDB official. During the interview, the official 
mentioned that CDB has gradually become a consultant and financier in the development of 
underdeveloped Chinese regions. As there are no clear goals about which sector to develop, and 
the local government lacks experience, CDB enjoys the freedom to determine the strength of the 
local economy and devises a developmental strategy for local enterprises as it sees fit. 
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tied to one specific ministry, and informal channels ensure that the ministry is much 
more influential than the Bank of Japan and other ministries. 
Japan has its own development bank, Development Bank of Japan (DBJ), 
that also offers a proportion of international services in addition to its domestic 
business.34 However, in terms of the international sphere, it is not as prominent as 
JBIC or JICA. JBIC is comparable to the Chinese policy banks in various ways: it 
is a policy bank that explicitly mentions Japan’s national interest, including: 
“promoting the overseas development and securement of resources which are 
important for Japan” and “Maintaining and improving the international 
competitiveness of Japanese industries” (JBIC, 2016); it issues non-concessional 
loans that are not bounded by OECD principles of ODA; in interviews with both 
JBIC and the three major Japanese commercial banks35 imply that, due to the 
governmental support from MOF and other ministries,36 JBIC is much more risk 
tolerant than commercial banks and often guides other capital providers into 
regions with economic uncertainty.  
In comparison, JICA is straightforwardly designed as a part of governmental 
administration. Its responsibility is to be in charge of Japanese ODA, or “forging 
bonds of trust” in euphemism (JICA, 2019). As China is not an OECD member and 
not restricted by ODA standards, there is no Chinese financial institution 
                                                   
34 Mentioned on the DBJ website, refer to: https://www.dbj.jp/en/. DBJ is involved in international 
trades as it is supposed to increase imports to Japan. 
35 The Mitsubishi Bank, Mutsui-Sumimoto Bank and Mizuho Bank. 
36 It is said that the risk of JBIC-sponsored projects can be reported to the Japanese government, 
which can act accordingly in the Paris Club – an international organization of major creditors. 
Also, the Japanese embassy will get involved if risk appears in JBIC projects. 
   95 
comparable to JICA. 
Both JICA and JBIC originated from Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM). 
JEXIM was created to facilitate Japanese economic activities with Southeast Asian 
countries and became the major instrument for overseas economic cooperation. 
In 1961, another institution named the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
(OECF) was founded as Japan’s foreign aid agency, so that Japanese official 
development assistance (ODA) can be separated from commercial loans. 
However, in overseas operations, it is not uncommon that JEXIM and OECF work 
together in ODA projects (Wie, 1994). In 1971, JICA was established as a 
separated agency, but it experienced series of rearrangements together with 
aforementioned institutions. JEXIM and OECF were integrated into the old JBIC in 
1999, which is responsible for both ODA and loans.37 In 2008, the old JBIC was 
again divided into JICA and Japan Finance Corporation (JFC); while JICA 
specialized in ODA, JFC had both domestic and international business coverage. 
In 2012, the latest reform stripped the international wing from JFC and formed a 
new JBIC independent from JFC.  
The constant rearrangement of Japanese banks are a result of international 
criticism of Japan’s practice of mixing ODA with economic policy, such as tying 
technical assistance to contract with Japanese companies (Hatch & Yamamura, 
1996). In addition, the Japanese government made arrangements to make its 
                                                   
37 The division of labor is slightly more complicated than a simple statement. In terms of ODA in 
the period of old JBIC, the JICA branch oversaw technical assistance, whereas the JBIC branch 
provided feasibility studies. Grants were issued by MOFA itself, which became the current 
overseer of JICA. Now these 3 parts of work becomes the responsibility of JICA. 
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policy banks financially independent. The third factor of bank reform is the 
reduction of Japanese state-owned corporation in 1990s (Milhaupt, 2003). As a 
result of a series of evolution, the current responsibility of the new JBIC, JICA and 
DBJ were mostly separated and clearly defined. 
3.4.4 Japan’s Paired Regulatory Structure 
The share of JBIC is held by Japanese government similar to the CDB 
model, but JBIC maintains financial independence. According to JBIC officials, the 
Japanese government does not participate in the profit-driven daily operation and 
decision making of JBIC. The JBIC Act requires the organization to make profit 
and submit 50% of the profit to MOF; meanwhile, the bank is exempt from bank’s 
corporate tax, whose rate is 40% for commercial banks. On the other hand, as a 
non-profit governmental institution affiliated with Japan’s MOFA, JICA is not 
allowed to issue bonds and operates based on governmental subsidy. Its foreign 
assistances are bounded by OECD documents on ODA.  
It is worth noting that, while ODA and OOF are explicitly separated in Japan, 
there is a certain degree of overlapping responsibility between JBIC and JICA. In 
the old JBIC, bank officials received applications for Japanese finance and might 
issue either ODA or OOF. After the JICA-JFC separation in 2008, the potential 
recipient can still apply for ODA and OOF from respective institutions if the project 
is considered to be strategically important and beneficial to Japanese national 
interest; the major difference between two institution is that (1) JFC/JBIC approval 
process is usually faster; (2) JFC/JBIC loan can be lent to private bank and fund 
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and can participate in equity share; (3) JICA is not allowed to issue its own bonds. 
The JBIC officials specifically mentioned two characteristics of the bank 
during interview, stressing on the market-oriented autonomous aspect of JBIC: 
First, the loan approval of JBIC is basically detached from other ministries aside 
from MOF, which JBIC board is supposed to coordinate with. Second, traditionally 
Japan uses a practice, “amakudari” (天降 , “descending from above”) to add 
ministerial representatives to the leadership of policy banks. However, this channel 
is diminishing in recent years, as JBIC and other liberalized banks employ more 
high-ranking officials from private companies (such as Toyota) and the bank itself.  
However, despite its financial independency, JBIC is still considered to “play 
the role as government” from the perspective of commercial banks and 
researchers. In joint investment projects by JBIC and commercial banks, there is 
a practice where the recipients “pay commercial bank first” and the Japanese 
government covers repayment if the recipients fail to pay. In addition, JBIC 
supports risky but politically important projects, but is instructed to avoid 
competition with commercial banks if the project is profitable38. The interactions 
between JBIC and commercial banks are further strengthened by informal 
communication; due to the headquarters of commercial banks and policy banks 
are relatively concentrated, informal meeting effectively enhance coordination 
among banks. 
                                                   
38 JBIC official explains that commercial banks are usually better at managing risks compared to 
JBIC because the policy bank do not have corporate account. 
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Aside from separated responsibilities, the Japanese policy banks have 
relatively clear ministerial affiliation compared to their Chinese counterparts: 
• The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is supposed to be the major assistant of 
Minister of State for Financial Services, and it is in charge of “investigation, 
planning and drafting of the Government financial institutions system”39. 
The ministry is in charge of a series of governmental financial institutions, 
including Japan Finance Corporation (which was the superior agency of 
JBIC from 2008 to 2012), DBJ and JBIC. The ownership of these institutions 
differ case by case; in terms of JBIC, the 2012 reform makes MOF the 
shareholder of JBIC, limits its influence on JBIC decision making and 
gradually limits its influence on personnel appoinment. However, as 
mentioned below, the informal influence of MOF and ministry-bank 
communication are still important. MOF also grants public capital to JICA, 
but it is not a chief regulator of JICA. 
• Japan has its own strategic planner, Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI). It has its own agent known as Nippon Export and 
Investment Insurance (NEXI), which provides insurance to overseas 
projects and shares information with companies and other governmental 
agents, but not funding. As a result of its defined responsibility, NEXI 
supplements policy banks and private insurance, but cannot implement 
financial assistance. While METI is in charge making industrial policies and 
                                                   
39 Quoted from Japan MOF, see https://www.mof.go.jp/english/about_mof/functions/index.htm 
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has sector-related departments to create governmental guidance, it lacks 
the authority of NDRC. It is implied during interview that inter-ministerial 
communication between METI and ministries leading policy banks – 
especially MOF and MOFA - are lacking. 
• Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is in charge of official 
development assistance, as ODAs are distributed according to the bilateral 
agreement between Japan and recipients. Upon its original establishment, 
JICA was put under the jurisdiction of MOFA as a semi-governmental 
organization. After its 2003 reform, the new JICA gained administrative 
independence, but it still an “governmental agency” staffed by governmental 
bureaucrats instead of a “state-owned corporation”. It should be noticed that 
JICA is not a corporation, that it is not required to make profit, and that its 
account is balanced by MOFA financial support. As a result, MOFA is 
closely control the operation of JICA. 
• Japan’s major banking regulator and enforcer of banking laws is Financial 
Service Agency (FSA), a governmental administration that reports to 
Minister of State for Financial Services. It is a general overseer and 
regulator of Japanese banking, insurance and security market. As JBIC is 
registered as a financial independent corporation, it is subject to the 
regulation of FSA. However, there is no evidence that FSA plays an active 
role in the public finance policy of Japan. 
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Aside from the regulatory affiliation, informal ties also contribute to the 
ministry-bank ties. The headquarters of these banks and respective regulators are 
relatively close, and physical intimacy serves as an important feature in practice: 
while the decision-making process of JBIC is theoretically independent from the 
government, MOF and JBIC staff are kept informed during decision making. For 
example, 40  when the Japanese prime minister wants to ease Japan-Russia 
relationship during a meeting with Putin, the prime minister office communicates 
with ministries such as MOF, which in turn informs the bank to seek potential 
projects. JBIC has as Account Executive Office that communicates with MOF in 
such circumstances. Compared with MOF, other ministries such as FSA and 
MOFA have less influence and only provide guidance on legal and risk by giving 
feedback on operations and interviewing bank officials, despite having regulatory 
authority or possessing representative in JBIC’s board of directors. The same 
intimacy and informal communication can also be applied to MOFA and JICA; in 
addition, as an agency dedicated to distributing assistances based on bilateral 
agreements, JICA is directly led by MOFA instead of joint regulators.  
These paired affiliations result in a relatively vertical structure of 
management, in which one ministry has more influence over others despite the 
presence of various ministerial representatives in the board. Due to limited 
authority over governmental agents, the Japanese policy makers rely heavily on 
                                                   
40 This is one of the cases mentioned by an official at Japanese commercial bank, however, he 
did not specify which year it is. 
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private banks and corporations to achieve goals of development. JBIC is also the 
major governmental co-investor cooperating with three commercial banks and 
function, similarly to CDB in terms of guiding social capital. 
3.4.5 The Effect of Authoritarianism in Regulations 
While the Chinese system seems to be more coordinated due to more 
authority from NDRC, it is not necessarily more effective. As mentioned above, the 
problem of common agency exists in both Chinese and Japanese systems due to 
the existence of diverse principals or regulators. China’s “fragmented 
authoritarianism”, which is a problem rooted deeply in the elite cadre system and 
planning economy of the socialist party-state, limits the effectiveness of NDRC – 
the chief regulator – to act consistently. It also raises the risk of rent seeking, which 
compromises accountability:  
The Chinese system is arguably more vulnerable to rent-seeking between 
state-owned enterprises and ministries. It is often observed that the Chinese SOEs 
and financiers form strong alliance (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011), and the overseas 
economic activities are supported by ministries such as MOFCOM. This adds to 
the difficulty of restricting certain types of overseas investment, given the 
operational autonomy of policy banks such as CDB.  
It is also suspected that mobilized coordination by one man led to the 
overgrowth of CDB41. During its expansion in late 1990s and early 2000s, CDB 
                                                   
41 This topic was touched during the interview, but the interviewee did not give permission to 
quote his experience. Most of the arguments come from the case study on CDB. 
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benefitted greatly from chairman Chen Yuan, a Chinese politician with immense 
resources due to his status as the son of Chen Yun – one of the most influential 
leader in post-Mao reform era (Rabinovitch, 2013). Because Chen Yuan was one 
of the few individuals with resource and charisma to promote the role of CDB, the 
bank soon became a developmental financier in many sectors of China’s domestic 
economy, including land investment (Sanderson & Forsythe, 2003). The priviledge 
of issuing “soft loan” also came within Chen’s term as chairman. While the political 
arrangements favoring CDB eventually made the bank one of the most important 
supporter of China’s domestic development and overseas expansion, it also made 
it difficult for regulators to supervise and monitor CDB. 
The following sections uses the cases of coal reduction and solar energy 
promotion to illustrate how the regulatory structure and “fragmented principals” 
affect implementation of policies. While the nowadays Japanese regulatory system 
suffers from lack of ministry-level coordination, the Chinese ones are highly 
dependent on the coherency of main principal and the principal-agent coordination. 
3.5 China’s Cases of Coal Reduction and Renewable Promotion 
3.5.1 Fragmented, Ineffective Coal Reduction 
As the largest carbon dioxide emitter, China faced international pressures 
to reduce carbon emission in recent years; additionally, China’s consumption of 
coal and electricity reached and passed its peak between 2010 and 2015. In light 
of this pressure, China made several international commitments; in 2015, for 
example, a joint statement by U.S. and Chinese presidents acknowledged that 
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China “agreed to work towards strictly controlling public investment flowing into 
projects with high pollution and carbon emissions both domestically and 
internationally” 42 . However, it was reported that China “outsources” carbon 
emissions by building coal-fired power plants in other countries (Sherwin, 2016)43. 
The major tension in China’s case of carbon export reduction boiled down to the 
conflicting goals of externalizing overcapacity and fulfilling environmental 
commitments.  
 China’s official policy to reduce coal usage and promote green energy were 
first shown in its 11th and 12th Five-Year Plan (2006-2015). China made more 
commitment after 2009, which became Chinese law and policy from three different 
channels: (1) a comprehensive plan of energy saving and emission reductions (节
能减排工作方案) from State Council (no ministry specified); (2) Environmental 
Protection Act (2014) from MEP; (3) guidance of green finance from CBRC. 
Meanwhile, the State Council also issued guiding principles for reducing 
overcapacity, which synergized with environmental protection efforts domestically. 
Based on the principles of State Council, NDRC announced a series of efforts to 
reduce overcapacity. 
                                                   
42 The White House, Office of The Press Secretary, 25/09/15, US-China joint presidential 
statement on climate change 
43 It should be noted that, while traditional “pollution outsourcing” implies leaving non 
environmental-friendly sections of the production chain to trade partners (Plumer, 2018), coal-
fired power plants are purely local and hardly contribute to bilateral trade between China and the 
recipient country. 
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 These policies influenced loan approval process of policy banks in four 
different channels. The environmental protection policies were reflected in both (1) 
the “Catalogue of Guidance on Industrial Structure Adjustment” (产业结构调整指
导目录) by NDRC and (2) the “Pivotal Industries” Catalogue by the banks. The 
overcapacity reduction policies, on the other hand, were reflected in (3) guidance 
documents from NDRC or joint ministries, which were more influential than the 
catalogues in loan approval. In addition to these channels, (4) the environmental 
protection policies and international environmental standards might be reflected in 
the loan approval process, especially in the environmental evaluation by state-
owned agencies or foreign agencies. 
The NDRC catalogue was the most important guidance document for 
sectoral development. The document was created in 2005 to supplement “Interim 
Provisions on Promoting Industrial Structure Adjustment” (促进产业结构调整暂行
规定) and revised in 2011 and 2013. It covered over 20 industrial sectors and over 
1000 subsectors, dividing them into three categories: industries that should be 
encouraged (鼓励类), restricted (限制类) or eliminated (淘汰类). The catalogue 
also applies to overseas business.  
Projects falling into the “eliminated” category would not be able to apply for 
any loans from either policy banks or commercial entities. Coal-fired projects, 
however, fell into the “restricted” category. The projects in such industries needed 
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to fulfill a higher standard of entrance (“高准入门槛”), but they could still receive 
loan if approved by the bank. This left the banks a certain degree of autonomy. 
Despite their official discouragement to the industry, the banks were never active 
advocates of overseas coal reduction. In interviews, the overseas finance of coal-
fired power plants was often justified using (1) the demand of recipient countries 
and (2) the relatively low emissions of Chinese large power plants compared to 
local “scattered”, backward coal power plants. 
In the domestic Chinese market, coal reduction was jointly enforced among 
ministries, as the goals of environmental protection and reducing overcapacity did 
not conflict. NDRC’s coal reduction policy resulted in a few bank policies: small 
power plants would not get funds44 and new proposals of major power plants would 
be heavily restricted (“限批 ”, restricting approvals). However, in terms of 
international economic activities, including investment and export of equipment 
and services, the policy of reducing overcapacity resulted in the outflow of coal-
fired power plants, due to regulators – including NDRC officials from different 
bureaus - having conflicting perspectives on coal power outside China. In 2016 
and 2017, the State Council distributed several guiding documents of overseas 
investments and Belt and Road projects, listing prohibited and encouraged 
                                                   
44 In practice, CDB is only involved in major domestic projects as the local government and local 
NDRC are in charge of the approval and support of smaller projects. Due to local protectionism 
and the pressure of employment, the policy of shutting down small coal-fired power plants has 
met oppositions. 
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sectors. However, coal electricity sector was not shown on the list, and coal-fired 
power plant remained a grey zone for loan approval.  
NDRC was the most influential and active regulator of the energy sector. 
NDRC created and maintained the catalogues, which laid the foundation for loan 
approval. It supervised the Energy Bureau of China, which oversaw creating long-
term strategies of energy sector. Additionally, overseas investments required the 
approval of NDRC. However, the bureaus within NDRC had conflicting views 
overseas coal production. On one hand, some of the interviewed NDRC officials 
agreed that the government and bank policies should move toward higher 
environmental standards (including the approval of coal-fired projects). On the 
other hand, other officials either denied the necessity of overseas coal-reduction 
policies as the sector is naturally dwindling or stressed on the free trade aspect of 
overseas power projects. 
The innate conflict of NDRC added to the dispute among regulators. The 
opinions among different officials were shown in the following table, with the 
“stances” gathered from interviews of governmental officials. Even within a ministry 
such as NDRC, different interviewees expressed vastly diverse opinions regarding 
overseas coal exports: voices supporting international effort of coal reduction, 
voices denying that coal export were a pressing matter, and voices justifying the 
export of China’s relatively clean, large scale power plants to coal-abundant 
countries. Overall, financial institutions that have already committed to green 
finance, such as PBOC opposed power plants, whereas trade promoters such as 
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MOFCOM and policy banks supported power plant exports (while stressing on the 
“rising environmental standard”). 
TABLE 3.1 ATTITUDES ON COAL EXPORTS AMONG INTERVIEWEES WITH 
VARIOUS AFFILIATIONS 
Supporter Neutral Oppose 
MOFCOM 
CHEXIM 
CDB 
NDRC Energy Bureau 
 
NDRC 
PBOC Research Institute 
-Market-driven behavior 
driven by the demand of other 
countries 
-Coal is cheap and affordable 
-Chinese technologies are 
cleaner than alternatives 
-Coal-fired power plant only 
took place in a small amount 
of countries with coal 
endowment; its export is not 
an important issue 
-Environment and social risk; 
-Profitability. Coal-fired power 
plants are among the most 
unprofitable projects 
-Adopting western env. 
standards 
Source: Various interviews with Chinese governmental officials 
Overall, the Chinese policy regarding to overseas coal export remained 
absent. With conflicting goals, the “principals” did not give clear instruction to the 
agent, leaving it to its for-profit autonomous operations. The Chinese policy banks 
claimed to have gradually adopted higher environmental standard and chosen the 
higher of the two between local and Chinese environmental standards in project 
evaluation and monitoring. However, they eventually responded to the loan 
demand from constructors of coal-fired power plants. When the regulators had 
conflicting goals, they could not task the banks to reduce overseas coal finance. 
The lack of policy stemmed not only from the diversified interest, but also from the 
“neutral” stance of NDRC toward overseas power plants.  
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3.5.2 Effective, Coordinated Solar Energy Promotion 
The Chinese system, while inefficient in restraining coal finance, contributed 
to the development of certain renewable energy sectors. The aforementioned 
catalogue always encouraged the development of green energies such as solar 
(photovoltaic, PV) and wind. In addition, CDB was also a major supporter of solar 
energy. With no opponents among regulators, NDRC and CDB formed a clear and 
efficient principal-agent relationship. 
Back in the 2000s, China was not the leading producer of solar energy, as 
its small, private photovoltaic enterprises struggled to find long-term financers. 
Both state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private enterprises were eligible for CDB 
and CHEXIM loan; however, as SOEs usually had a long history of cooperating 
with the policy banks, they gradually accumulated higher credit line in the credit 
investigation systems of policy banks45. In addition, governmental subsidies did 
not cover commercial projects such as PV export, and sometimes failed to be 
delivered to enterprises. In such cases, state intervention was necessary for 
sectoral development. China Development Bank actively supported the industry 
since 2003 – long before the introduction of governmental subsidies 46 , and 
gradually became the most important driving force behind the industry. 
                                                   
45 Mentioned in the interview with researchers from Global Economic Institute (GEI), Beijing. 
However, the actual credit rate is not known. The difference between SOE and private 
enterprises does not come from interest rate, but the amount of loans they are able to borrow. As 
the credit line is also associated with mortgage, small enterprises also face additional difficulty to 
get governmental loans and have to borrow from other financiers.  
46 The solar energy program was, according to interviewees, originally developed as a part of 
development programs for Midwest China. However, the photovoltaic industry that contributed to 
China’s solar export came mostly from costal provinces. 
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Meanwhile, NDRC also showed a clear intention to support the solar sector. 
It announced its mid-long-term plan to increase solar installation in 2007; two years 
before the plan, the solar industry was already listed in the first version of the 
NDRC catalogue as an “encouraged” industry, together with wind, geothermal, 
biomass and maritime energy (the same as Japan).  
CDB’s first loan to the PV industry was approved in 2003, and the bank 
published “Review Guide for the Development of PV and Solar Power Generation” 
(太阳能光伏发电项目 开发评审指导意见) in 2009. At the time CDB was the largest 
financer of the PV industry in China, supporting the development of solar power 
plants in mid-western Chinese provinces and the export of PV equipment to the 
North American and European market. During this period, CDB also cooperated 
with local governments to support PV industries; the local governments provided 
mortgages and CDB provided non-concessional loans.  
The CDB finance led to an expansion of Chinese PV export from 2009 to 
2012; however, the explicit subsidies also led to anti-dumping duty imposed by the 
U.S. and European Union in 2012 and heavy loss among Chinese PV companies. 
From the perspective of CDB, the bank managed its risk via mortgages; however, 
as most of the mortgage asset provided by local governments lacked liquidity, the 
bank still suffered considerable financial loss. 
Regardless of the reason for overseas setback, CDB continued to support 
the PV industry and to collaborate with related policy makers. CDB officials 
concluded that the PV development from 2009 to 2012 was largely based on 
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preferential policy instead of the market. After the PV failure, CDB changed its 
sectoral strategy to “cultivated by government, evaluated by market” (市场培育，
政府评价), which promotes “flexible policy” and “market-based trial and error” (政
策要有弹性，让市场试错). CDB also had two other instruments unique on its own: 
its domestic and international risk rating for the PV industry and the bank’s own 
policy to support the industry. CDB has been continuously issuing more than 20 
billion RMB loans to Chinese companies via various subsidiary companies since 
2014, thus remaining as the key agent of governmental support. 
In the post-lawsuit years, regulator’s support to CDB and the solar industry 
remained strong. In 2013, the State Council introduced “Notice on Exerting Price 
Leverage to Promote the Healthy Development of the Photovoltaic Industry”; CDB 
and the Energy Bureau of NDRC jointly announced a plan to increase the amount 
and recipient of PV loan. In 2014, CDB set up an independent company, CDB 
Energy, to attract international capital for equity investment in the PV industry. 
Aside from leading private capital similar to JBIC, CDB also actively influenced the 
industrial planning in the 13th Five-Year Plan by NDRC, thus becoming an active 
regulator of the industry.  
The joint effort of principal and agent turned out to be a major success. After 
a period of “unregulated and subsidized” development, the Chinese solar energy 
reached a relatively competitive price. By 2015, China surpassed Germany as the 
largest PV producer. By 2018, Chinese capacity of PV products made up 75% of 
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world production. On July 1st, 2018, China reduced its subsidies to the PV industry, 
urging Chinese companies to seek international markets in countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Once again, governmental loans from CDB and 
CHEXIM were granted to companies as capital. As Germany focused on domestic 
PV upgrade in recent years, the new wave of PV exports from China quickly seized 
a large proportion of the global market. While the subsidized export draws criticism 
from Japanese and Korean competitors, the “industrial cultivation” by CDB resulted 
in a much larger Chinese PV industry compared to its Japanese counterpart.  
In retrospect, the two Chinese cases showed the importance of a consistent 
and supportive principal. In the case of coal reduction, CDB had limited incentive 
to self-impose an overseas coal-reduction policy. The Chinese ministries 
supported or opposed reducing overseas coal-fired projects, and no consensus 
was reached. With the major coordinator innately conflicted, it was impossible for 
the principals to enforce a consistent mandate on the agent. In the case of solar 
energy, as the solar (PV) industry was considered to be one of the “encouraged” 
sectors, NDRC (and MOFCOM) actively supported CDB. Meanwhile, CDB actively 
advocated and was the frontline implementer of supportive policies, thus forming 
an effective principal-agent relationship in solar promotion.  
3.6 Japanese Coal Reduction 
3.6.1 Limited Policy, Less Coordinated Coal Reduction 
Japan has 11 electricity companies across the country; these companies 
both maintain domestic energy infrastructure and construct overseas power plants. 
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Japan’s effort of systemically reducing domestic and overseas coal electricity was 
interrupted by Fukushima Accident, which forced the Japanese government to shut 
down nuclear power plants and rely on fossil fuels including coal. As a result of 
heavy reliance on coal-fired electricity companies, Japan remained one of the 
leading exporters of coal-fired power plants. The conflicting goals of Japanese 
government were its environmental obligations as an OECD country and Japan’s 
heavy dependence on coal electricity industry. 
 The Japanese energy concerns were summarized as “3E+S”, with safety 
prioritized before energy security, efficiency, and environment. Before Fukushima 
Accident and after the Copenhagen Conference, the Japanese government 
intended to promote “long term energy mix”, which involved reducing coal-fired 
power plants and promoting nuclear power plants. Japan had long-term goals to 
reduce coal consumption by 50% by 2050 (BBC News, 2007) and to reduce 
greenhouse gas by 80% by 2050 (Ministry of the Environment Japan, 2012). After 
Fukushima, however, the safety of coal energy triumphed over environmental 
concerns. The Japanese government struggled to find an alternative energy to 
fossil fuel (coal and LNG). It maintained a heavy reliance on coal-fired power 
plants, and therefore maintained high capacity of constructing coal-fired power 
plants.  
Faced with domestic reliance of coal electricity companies and lack of 
incentive from banks, Japanese regulators of the coal industry failed to effectively 
channel environmental commitments into policies. METI was the major energy 
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policy maker and has related departments, such as the Renewable Energy 
Department and the Electricity and Gas Department. Due to the west-east division 
of Japanese grid, METI also held a coordinating platform, Organization for Cross-
regional Coordination of Transmission Operators (OCCTO), for Japanese power 
companies. However, compared to Chinese NDRC, METI lacked the authorities to 
creates official documents that guides bank operation, and OCCTO lacked 
regulatory power. Theoretically the Japanese ministries would communicate with 
each other, channeling METI policy to agencies such as JICA and JBIC. The 
communication among METI, MOFA and MOF were ineffective in practice, with 
ministerial tension implied by interviewees, which left METI relatively powerless as 
the single active principal.  
The coal reduction policy from METI were mainly (1) the Basic Environment 
Plan sets up a goal to reduce carbon emission; (2) a plan of diversifying energy 
consumption, including special program in which the Japanese governmental 
financers (mainly JBIC) subsidized green energy industries; (3) collaboration 
between the Japan-led Asia Development Bank (ADB) and Japanese policy banks 
to set up high standard for quality infrastructure; (4) a plan to increase R&D funding 
to energy efficiency and green energy, and (5) political attempts to re-open nuclear 
stations, which was still under debate and could not be implemented. However, 
these policies were never systemically transferred into loan approval process. Due 
to the internal disagreement among OCCTO power companies and the lack of 
coordination among ministries, the Japanese policy banks did not receive clear 
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instruction on overseas finance and acted mainly on self-imposed coal reduction 
policies. 
Japan also faced international pressure of reducing coal usage and 
promoting renewable energy; however, the pressure seldomly substantiated into 
actually bank regulations. In 2015, the western OECD countries formed a 
consensus (Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits) on raising the 
environmental standard of overseas projects, which pressured both private and 
public financer to promote “green finance”. The OECD statement on coal-fired 
power plants required OECD members to raise standard of coal-fired power plants 
to ultra-supercritical. Japan defended its right to export coal-fired power plants, 
eventually making a compromise with the U.S. and western OECD members 
(Moritsugu, 2015). The Japanese government, enterprises and media defended 
domestic coal usage (Energy Monitor Worldwide, 2018); in doing so, however, 
Japan also maintained high capability of coal-fired power plant construction.  
JICA’s sole responsibility of granting ODA determined that the agency was 
strictly bounded by OECD principles. As a result, JICA’s energy assistance mostly 
went to sectors such as transportation, administration and training; a few coal-fired 
power plants financed by JICA were plants with “experimental” clean coal 
technology. On the other hand, commercial banks and JBIC were not restricted by 
such rules; each bank individually raised environmental standard based on their 
own standard, but they are still often accused of exporting carbon emissions (Chen 
H. , 2018) (States News Service, 2019). Similar to Chinese banks, JBIC’s stance 
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on maintaining coal export mainly included two points: Japan accumulated 
abundant technological advantage in “clean” coal electricity; recipient countries 
such as Indonesia had strong demand for coal-fired power plants.  
This study argues that Japanese regulatory structure limited the 
effectiveness of sectoral policy and maintained a relatively high degree of 
autonomy of both JICA and JBIC. Additionally, while JICA was bound by OECD 
environmental standard, JBIC had regulatory autonomy and strong financial 
support from the state. Although JBIC itself maintained relatively high 
environmental standard, it might have become a favored financer for coal 
companies compared to both JICA and private banks, thus continuing to finance 
overseas coal-fired power plants. 
3.6.2 Diminished advantage – less effective renewable promotion 
Once the world’s leading producer of photovoltaic power equipment, Japan 
was surpassed by China and Germany in recent years. In recent decades, Japan’s 
solar enterprises suffered from high production cost, which made it difficult for them 
to compete with fossil fuels without governmental support. Also, the Japanese 
power grid made it especially difficult to promote solar energy. While the slow 
development of green energy sectors in Japan was largely a result of resistance 
of power companies, the vertical structure also made it difficult for policy makers 
in METI to reach its financers and actively support the green energy industries.  
 Japan’s green energy mostly consists of geothermal, wind, solar and 
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maritime energy 47 , most of which are underdeveloped compared to their 
theoretical potential. Solar energy has the largest capacity among green energies. 
The cumulative power generation capacity reached 50GW and could supply 5% of 
Japan’s annual electricity demand in 2016.  
Historically, MITI and METI had multiple R&D projects to develop solar 
industry, including Sunshine Project in 1974, New Sunshine Project in 1993 and 
World Energy Network, which resulted in Japan’s advantageous position as the 
leading PV producer in late 1990s. However, Japan’s promotion of solar energy 
faced one great obstacle: the lack of national grid and the existence of 11 power 
companies – most of which heavily relied on nuclear and coal electricity (Sugiura 
& Okutsu, 2018). Developing the solar sector would require mobilizing some of the 
power companies and promote a national grid. The Sunshine Project received 
limited financial support and solar companies struggled to compete with cheap 
fossil fuels. Japan was surpassed by Germany as the largest photovoltaic producer 
in 2005. 
In order to further promote solar energy, METI introduced feed-in tariff 
scheme that provide subsidies to power companies based on their green energy 
generation. The tariff was first approved in 2008 and revised in 2012 and 2016, 
serving as the major preferential economic policy for Japanese solar power 
industry. Together with the “energy mix” policy after 2011 Fukushima Accident, the 
                                                   
47 The definition of Japan’s green energy is a debatable topic. In the METI strategy of energy mix, 
hydroelectricity is considered as a part (and the biggest part) of Japan’s green energy. Also, in 
the perspective of older Japanese people, nuclear energy is a “green energy” since it was 
advertised as such when it was introduced into Japan in 1950s.  
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country rapidly increased PV installment, pushing the proportion of solar energy in 
total energy from 0.5% in 2011 to 5.9% in 2017 (IEA, 2018) and reducing the price 
of solar energy significantly. However, as coal remained one of the cheapest 
energy and only lost to LNG (widely used) and nuclear (suspended) (Tanaka, 
2018), Japanese solar energy companies still faced strong competition. While the 
Japanese solar sector steadily grew, its growth was surpassed by emerging PV 
producers such as China. 
Throughout its solar promotion, Japan relied heavily on feed-in tariff, as 
there was no systemic policy to support solar power companies from governmental 
financers such as JICA, JBIC and DBJ. Combined with a general resistance of 
solar power among power companies that METI was supposed to coordinate, the 
lack of inter-ministerial cooperation limited the ability for METI to support the PV 
industry. Both R&D subsidies and feed-in tariff were designed to enhance the 
market competitiveness of solar energy, yet the domestic market for solar was 
limited even after the Fukushima Accident and the price of solar energy was still 
high compared to both coal and LNG. Even Japan already had the second largest 
PV installment in the world, it only contributed to a small proportion of Japan’s 
energy consumption and would continue to have limited proportion in Japan’s long-
term energy plan (Japan METI, 2015).  
In both the coal reduction and solar promotion cases, the Japanese 
government designed policies that faced strong opposition: Japan’s heavy reliance 
on coal electricity enterprises. Specific economic policy was required to incentivize 
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the market to reduce coal export and promote clean energy; however, METI lacked 
the authority to command financial institutions such as JICA and JBIC. Without the 
financial support of state agents, the governmental policy became difficult to 
implement. Compared to the Chinese case, the problem of Japan came from the 
lack of coordination among ministries; as a result, while METI itself was a 
consistent stakeholder, its regulation was ineffective. 
3.7 Recapping Chinese and Japanese Cases 
 The paper compares current policy regulatory system in China and Japan. 
The study focuses on how the governmental policy discouraging coal and 
promoting green energy affects overseas loan and aid policy of the four Chinese 
and Japanese public financiers.  
To a certain extent, all the interviewed governmental and bank stakeholders 
stress on China and Japan’s international commitment to reduce carbon emission 
and promote clean energy, although third-party data indicates that coal-fired power 
plants are still being built by the policy banks. The domestic regulation in both 
countries do not apply to overseas projects, and the banks have considerable 
autonomy in the approval of overseas loans. Both countries had conflicted 
interests supporting and opposing the export of coal-fired power plant. As a result, 
the principals could not act coherently in most cases. 
In the cases of coal power plant export, neither China nor Japan had a clear 
policy restricting overseas construction of coal-fired power plants. Overseas coal 
finance reduction was inefficient in both countries, but for different reasons: 
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Chinese principals, especially NDRC, had the capacity to directly shape loan 
approval via the NDRC catalogue, but ministries and NDRC itself had different 
interests in the export of coal-fired power plants. On the other hand, the Japanese 
policy makers in METI lacked the capability to shape loan approval of JBIC and 
JICA, causing the banks to support pro-coal power companies. Japanese banks 
relied on OECD or self-imposed environment standard to reduce coal finance, but 
their continued to support “clean” coal-fired power plants.  
The promotion of solar energy also showed that the Chinese principal-agent 
relationship is more capable of supporting “pivotal” industry due to CDB and NDRC 
actively supporting the sector in a consensus. In China’s case, CDB originally 
acted autonomously, supporting the PV industries with loans even before the 
introduction of governmental subsidies. After the overseas defeats in the U.S. and 
EU, CDB and NDRC continued their cooperation, adopted a more flexible, market-
oriented loan policy, and continued to support the PV industry with public capital 
and preferential policy. Japan had a long history of PV development; however, its 
development was slower due to limited governmental support. METI mainly used 
feed-in tariff to support the sector, which was effective but limited; without systemic 
financial support from policy banks, the Japanese solar electricity companies 
struggled to compete with cheaper alternatives. METI’s subsidies and tariffs 
indeed contributed to sectoral growth after Fukushima, but Japan was still 
surpassed by China as the leading PV producers.  
The cases of the solar (PV) sector show that, in the case of “strategically 
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important” industries that faces little opposition among principals and agents, 
Chinese system might be more efficient at mobilizing agents compared to 
nowadays Japanese system. 
3.8 Conclusion 
 China and Japan are the only major economies that heavily use public 
financiers in overseas expansion. This phenomenon leads to questions about the 
effectiveness of state principals controlling the overseas economic activities of 
state agents. How does the regulatory arrangement in home country determine the 
efficiency a policy is implemented? The study explores how the governmental 
regulatory structure influences state agents’ policy implementation in China and 
Japan. It mainly uses interviews of long-time researchers and, more importantly, 
governmental and bank officials to explore the domestic regulatory structure of the 
two countries. 
The origin and evolution of Chinese and Japanese policy banks affect the 
regulatory structures, which in turn affect the governmental-bank relationship. The 
Chinese policy banks were established with ambiguous division of responsibility, 
with CDB covering a wide spectrum of businesses; as a result, the Chinese policy 
banks, especially CDB, need to be regulated by an umbrella of different ministries 
led by a powerful national economic planner. On the other hand, the Japanese 
policy banks have been repeatedly rearranged to specialize in different types of 
financial supports; agencies such as JBIC, JICA and NEXI are heavily influenced 
by one of the many regulating ministries. While METI remains as the strategic 
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planner of Japanese economy, it lacks channel or ability to directly coordinate with 
policy banks compared to China’s NDRC.  
As a result of such evolutions, the Chinese policy bank regulation is a joint 
effort in which different ministries coordinate to form a policy. While Japanese 
government theoretically has similar structure, the absence of a powerful strategic 
planner — NDRC in the case of China — and strict division of responsibilities 
among financial institutions limits the capability of METI to create and implement 
policies. The Chinese regulatory model still suffers from “fragmented 
authoritarianism”, which makes it less effective in many circumstances: Not only 
do different ministries have their own interest, NDRC itself has conflicting interests 
and might not act affirmatively to support or oppose a policy – as the case of coal 
reduction shows. However, when the Chinese banks and NDRC are mobilized to 
promote a policy, the Chinese model becomes arguably more efficient.  
This study implies that the Chinese model of development is similar but 
innovative compared to previous state-led development models in East Asia, 
mostly thanks to the unique and influential position of NDRC and CDB. Both China 
and Japan have industrial planners, governmental subsidies and governmental 
agents, yet the Chinese policy makers in NDRC have more power to coordinate 
with other ministries and to influence the flow of public capital. Meanwhile, CDB 
functions as a combination of JBIC and DBJ, has the capability to develop an 
industry, and can influence its regulators to shape industrial policies. The strong 
roles of NDRC and CDB do not always lead to more efficient policy 
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implementation, as consensus among regulators and CDB is still necessary for 
policy implementation. However, if both CDB and its regulators actively promote a 
policy, the Chinese system is more effective compared to its Japanese 
counterparts. This implies that, in the development of “key” industries, the Chinese 
regulatory system allows the Chinese government to more efficiently support 
overseas economic activities via state agents. 
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